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ABSTRACT
5,424 Japanese prisoners were captured by Allied 
forces during World War II and brought to the United States 
for internment. No scholarly account has been written of 
these men. This thesis will explain why there were so few, 
where they were interned, and the conditions of their 
internment.
The topic was researched at the National Archives and 
Records Administration in Washington, D. C., through inter­
views with veterans who served in the Pacific Campaign or 
had contact with the Japanese prisoners, through newspaper 
and magazine articles of the time, and through secondary 
sources of the Pacific Campaign.
The Campaign in the Pacific became a brutal race war, 
with few prisoners taken. Even those taken were not gua­
ranteed to make it back to the United States for intern­
ment. However, those who did were treated well, in light 
of their circumstances. This was the result of three 
different factors: those in charge of the Japanese con­
finement saw the prisoners as humans, America did not want 
the Japanese to retaliate against U.S. prisoners for
v i
actions taken against the Japanese prisoners, and the U.S. 
was trying to gain the cooperation of the prisoners, who 
responded better to kindness than to abuse, against which 
they were more prepared.
v n
CHAPTER ONE
THE FEW, THE HUMBLED
From the capture of Kazuo Sakamaki, the United States' 
first prisoner of war in World War II, to the capture of 
the last in August of 1945, only 5,424 Japanese prisoners 
were brought to the continental United States.^ Although 
the first American prisoner— and the only one for over six 
months--was Japanese, the Japanese prisoners trickled in 
only a few at a time and they were soon heavily outnumbered 
by both German and Italian prisoners. The number of Japa­
nese prisoners entering the U.S. did not even exceed 100 
until March, 1944, when after two years of fighting, 206 
prisoners were brought in from the Pacific. In fact, the 
Battles of the Java Sea, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, 
Savo Island, Bismark Sea, New Guinea, Kula Gulf, Bougain­
ville, Tarawa, and Makin combined only netted the Allied 
forces 604 prisoners. Only when the emperor issued his 
order condemning suicide in the Philippines did numbers 
begin to increase in any significant measure.^ One reason 
for this small number of prisoners was the Japanese 
soldiers' aversion to capture.
1
2Ruth Benedict, a sociologist who studied the Japanese 
during World War II, tried to explain the Japanese aversion 
to capture through an understanding of their culture. The 
Japanese, she explained, were taught from childhood that 
certain debts were owed to many people, including the 
emperor, parents, ancestors, teachers, and various superi­
ors. These debts were known as on and were seen as un­
avoidable disgraces. Everyone worked all of their lives 
to repay the debt of on, but it could never be fully re-
t Cpaid.
It would be impossible, they feel, to be 
glad of one's country, of one's life, of one's 
great and small concerns without thinking also 
of receiving these benefits. In all Japanese 
history [the] ultimate person among living men 
to whom one was indebted was the highest supe­
rior within one's horizon. It has been at 
different periods the local seignor, the feudal 
lord, and the Shogun. [During World War II] it 
[was] the Emperor. . . . Every partiality they
have for their own way of living increases each 
man's Imperial 'on'; every cigarette distribut­
ed to the Army on the front lines in the 
Emperor's name during the war underscored the 
'on' each soldier wore for him; every sip of 
sake doled out to them before going into battle 
was a further Imperial 'on'. Every kamakazi 
pilot of a suicide plane was, they said, repay­
ing his Imperial 'on'; all the troops who, they 
claimed, died to a man defending some island of 
the Pacific were said to be discharging their 
limitless 'on' to the Emperor.
However, according to Benedict, on contributed to the 
Japanese aversion to capture in another way as well. 
Accepting any gift or aid forces the recipient to accept on 
from their benefactor. While this was accepted practice,
3it was very offensive. "Casual favors from relative 
strangers [were] the ones most resented, for with neighbors 
and in old, established hierarchical relationships a man 
knows and has accepted the complication of on. But with 
mere acquaintances and near equals men chafe. They would 
prefer to avoid getting entangled in all the consequences
■7of on." Thus, whxle American chivalry requires the hero
to come to the rescue of a man in trouble, "Japanese valor
repudiates such salvaging. . . . There was virtue only in
8accepting life or death risks."
Any Occidental army which has done its 
best and finds itself facing hopeless odds 
surrenders to the enemy. They still regard 
themselves as honorable soldiers and by inter­
national agreement their names are sent back to 
their country so that their families may know 
that they are alive. They are not disgraced as 
either soldiers or citizens or in their own 
families. But the Japanese defined the situa­
tion differently. Honor was bound up with 
fighting to the death. In a hopeless situation 
a Japanese soldier should kill himself with his 
last hand grenade or charge weaponless against 
the enemy in a mass suicide attack. But he 
should not surrender. Even if he were taken 
prisoner when he was wounded and unconscious, 
he 'could not hold up his head in Japan' again; 
he was disgraced; he was dead to his former 
life.°
Thus, surrender, where a person must owe his life not 
only to a stranger, but to an enemy, was the most extreme 
disgrace to the Japanese. Therefore, even the most wounded 
or helpless soldiers normally preferred death to surrender.
Navy Captain Matao Okino, one of the most senior
4Japanese prisoners held in the United States during World 
War II, felt that the Bushido Code or "the way of the 
Warrior" was the reason for this mindset. He listed six 
precepts he felt were vital to the battlefield psychology 
of the Japanese soldier:
1. Although life is important, death is 
lighter than a bird's feather.
2. Not only has the soldier no fear of 
death, but going a step further, he will not 
die before he overthrows his enemy.
3. The spirit of the deathless patriotism 
of Kusunoki Kasashigi (a historical figure of 
the 14th century noted for his loyalty to the 
Emperor Godaigo.)
4. Because there is a country, the family 
exists; because the is a country, the individu­
al exists; therefore, loyalty and filial piety 
are the same.
5. Death in battle is not only an indi­
vidual honor but family honor, and this idea is 
constantly handed down to children.
6. A prisoner of war not only brings 
disgrace on himself but also on his family, 
and, destroying the honor of his country, casts 
the shadow of disgrace on future generations. u
These precepts can be traced directly back to the 
Bushido Code of the Samurai, which itself can be traced 
back to the earliest history and religion of the Japanese 
people. By the eighth century, the chief of the Yamato 
clan, the dominant clan, had become Emperor. The chroni­
cles, Kojiki and Nihonqi, which developed the Japanese 
creation mythology, helped to establish his sovereignty by 
tracing his ancestry to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, who was
5the most powerful of the Japanese deities. Later, as Japan 
developed a feudal system, his sovereignty was upheld by 
the Shoguns, who used the myth of his ancestry to maintain 
their own power, and the deity of the Emperor became a 
fundamental precept of Japanese religious life. This 
brought about a fierce loyalty to the emperor and nation, 
which, by the 13th century, had been expanded and developed 
into the cardinal virtue of the Bushido Code of the 
Samurai. With the entrance of Zen Buddhism to Japan, 
teaching self-discipline and intuitive "right thinking", 
and Confucianism, which insisted on respect for traditional 
authority, this Bushido Code developed into an ethic of 
absolute loyalty and unhesitating sacrifice. ^ ^
During the same time, there also developed a form of 
ritual suicide known as seppuku or hari-kiri (belly- 
slitting) . The act of hari-kiri proper can be traced back 
to a 12th century warrior who "ripped open his belly with a 
sword rather than face capture" and thus set free his 
spirit, but the practice of the Japanese warrior committing 
suicide rather than succumbing to capture dates well before 
that. However, for centuries, the practice was reserved 
by law to the samurai. Only in 1887, when the Meiji gov­
ernment abolished the samurai caste and destroyed its last 
defenders in the Satsuma Rebellion, was the practice em­
braced by others. The Meiji forces, conscripts of all 
ranks and classes, overpowered the last defenders of the
6Samurai tradition, who were led by Field Marshall Takemori
Saigo, the former commander of the Imperial Guard. When
hope was lost, Saigo and his followers killed themselves in
full view of Meiji's troops. This act so impressed the
Meiji troops that they adopted the tradition. Thus, the
Meiji government, intending to discredit and destroy the
samurai, instead filled their conscripted forces with the
samurai spirit as the troops viewed themselves from that
• 13day on as the new samurai.
The Meiji government continued the evolution of the 
Japanese Bushido code in other ways as well. Shinto became 
the national religion of Japan, demanding absolute "loyalty 
to the Emperor, divine head of the national family, at one 
with and indivisible from the concept of Dai Nippon ('Grea­
ter Japan')."^  A Conscription Law made all men between 
17 and 40 liable for seven years of military duty (three 
years active duty and four years in the reserve). When 
draftees protested, a Soldier's Code, listing the seven 
duties of the soldier--loyalty, unquestioning obedience, 
courage, the controlled use of physical force, frugality, 
honor, and respect for superiors— soon followed. The 
government also developed a modern school system, and in 
the late 1870's, began to impose controls over its educa­
tional content.
"The Meiji authorities wanted education to turn out 
citizens who spontaneously and enthusiastically supported
7national policies. A willingness to die for the country in 
time of war was stressed as 'loyalty to the emperor and 
love of country'. Every subject was "systematically 
inculcated" with militarism at the beginning of the Russo- 
Japanese war and the militaristic taint stayed with the 
education system until the end of World War II. "Starting 
in 1925, active duty military [personnel] were assigned to 
every school from the middle school level up (except girls' 
schools), and military training became part of the regular 
curriculum. The next year youth training centers were 
established in every city, town, and village as part of a 
four-year program of four hundred hours of military in­
struction for males whose formal education ended at elemen- 
tary school." In this way, the military gained control 
over the training of everyone, the sons of the middle and 
upper classes in school and the sons of the poor with the 
youth training centers.
Militarism gained control over textbooks as well. In
1880, the government compiled a list of books prohibited
1 ftfor use as textbooks. Six years later, all textbooks 
were required to be certified by the Ministry of Education 
before adoption. Compulsory education was established, 
attaining an enrollment rate of over 90 percent, and then 
increased from three years to six years. Finally, in 1904, 
the Ministry of Education began to compile each of the 
texts used at the primary levels, which was the only
8education most Japanese received. These books developed 
the same militaristic tinge that the rest of the education­
al system contained. For example, lesson 7 from Elementary 
School Reader No. £3, published in 1904, was entitled "Takeo 
Joins the Service" and included the following exchange:
Takeo: Father, the idea of 'joining the
service of my country' makes me so proud and 
happy. I'll be trained and when war comes, I 
will not be afraid to die. I'll give every­
thing I have to show what a good Japanese 
fighting man is made of.
Father: That's the spirit! You must be
that determined. Don't be afraid to die.
Don't worry about us here. And you must always 
be faithful to the Imperial Precepts to Sol­
diers and Sailors. ^
A second story, called "A Sailor's Mother", was in 
another elementary reader:
A sailor receives a letter from his moth­
er: "You wrote that you did not participate in
the battle of Toshima Island. You were in the 
August 10 attack on Weihaiwei but you didn't 
distinguish yourself with an individual ex­
ploit. To me this is deplorable. Why have you 
gone to war? Your life is to be offered up to 
requit [sic] your obligations to our benevolent 
Emperor." An officer, seeing him reading the 
letter and crying, comforted the sailor: "Son, 
there'll surely be another glorious war before 
long. Let's accomplish great feats of bravery 
then and bring honor to our ship Takachiho. 
Explain that to your mother and put her mind at 
ease.
The government also issued the Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, which all ranks were required 
to learn by heart and meditate on daily, and the Rescript
9on Education of 1890. These taught that "duty is more 
weighty than a mountain; death is no heavier than a feath­
er." Yamagata Arimoto, a forceful advocate of the re­
scripts, wrote that "the indispensable elements of a for­
eign policy to protect [Japan's] interests are first,
troops and armaments and second, education. Education
■ • ? 1should foster and preserve patriotism."
This training, and the Imperial Rescripts, elevated 
the Bushido virtues to the status of sacred obligations and 
made hari-kiri the only viable alternative to failure in 
war. This helped to cause tragedies like the one at Sai­
pan. "When American occupation of Saipan became inevita­
ble, approximately 200 Japanese soldiers and sailors were 
issued poison by their officers for the purpose of commit­
ting suicide. The poison was a white powder diluted with 
water, and had a very bitter taste. In a formal ceremony, 
the cry 'Bonzai for the Emperor' was repeated three times
and the poison drunk. The men started dying about four
• • • 22 mxnutes after drinking the poison."
There were other, more pragmatic reasons for the 
Japanese refusal to surrender, however. The Japanese 
military told its soldiers that since surrender was a 
disgrace to the entire country, any soldier who was cap­
tured and then returned to Japan would be executed, which 
was not true. Japanese prisoners taken in Bataan had been 
"court-martialed to determine how much information they had
10
divulged to the U.S. forces, but other than this were in no 
way shamed" after their release. Prisoners who had been 
captured and released from the Russians or Chinese were 
tested for Communistic tendencies and "those considered 
'reformed' were immediately discharged from the Army and 
returned to their villages. Thus, the only prisoners 
executed were those deemed to have 'Communistic tenden­
cies' . However, most Japanese soldiers were not in­
formed of this, so the propaganda against surrender was 
quite successful. Captain Okino noted that "the honor, 
succor, and solace from both the government and people for 
the families of those who die in battle leaves nothing to 
be desired," but "when a man becomes a prisoner of war, he 
is condemned to death, regardless of the reason for his 
capture. Moreover, this punishment will affect his entire
O  C . . .family and relatives." "If and when a conscript dies in
action or is, after having been missing for an unstipulated
(perhaps three months) period, by the War Ministry declared
dead, the employer's salary to dependents ceases, and that
Ministry provides support (amount not made public) for the
9 fwidow and children until full sixteen years of age." A 
POW's family, not receiving this support, would wind up on 
the streets, destitute.
Several other prisoners reiterated Captain Okino's 
statements in the course of their interrogations, although 
some expressed hope that they might be "let off with life
11
imprisonment" because of extenuating circumstances, such as 
debilitating wounds or unconsciousness during capture.
They hoped that a furyo, a man captured against his will, 
would be better off than a horyo, a man who voluntarily
surrendered, but every prisoner felt sure he faced "execu-
• • ■ ■ • 2 7tion, imprisonment, or, at best, social ostracism".
Thus, the Japanese used a modern Bushido Code to encourage
their men against surrender and backed it up with threats
of punishment and death.
When the tide of war began to turn against Japan, 
commanders, forced to use second-rate troops, began using 
other means to discourage surrender as well. They main­
tained discipline and ensured the "fighting spirit" of 
their troops by telling their soldiers that there was no 
alternative to death, since American troops would torture 
and kill any prisoners they captured. Rumors were added 
to this propaganda. "The Chinese were reported to roast 
their captives and cut out their hearts. Young American 
men, it was said, gualified for the Marine Corps by murder­
ing their parents, and routinely raped and killed women in 
Asia. . . . The Allies killed prisoners on the battle­
fields by laying them on the ground and running them over 
with tanks and bulldozers, and intended to drastically 
depopulate Japan itself if they won." This propaganda 
was given credibility by several atrocities carried out by 
Allied front line troops and was quite successful. When
12
captured, the Japanese prisoners expressed amazement at the 
treatment they received and told of the horrors they had 
come to expect. "In a report dated June 1945, the U.S. 
Office of War Information noted that 84 percent of one 
group of interrogated Japanese prisoners (many of them 
injured or unconscious when captured) stated that they had 
expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken 
prisoner. The OWI analysts described this as being 
typical . . ."30
Because of these conditions, "most of the enemy taken 
prisoner either were badly wounded or were unconscious; 
they could not prevent capture or commit suicide before
O Ifalling into American hands." "On Guadalcanal between 
40-45 thousand Japanese soldiers participated. Of this 
number approximately three thousand were evacuated and less 
than one thousand captured, many of these being 
l a b o r e r s . I n  July, 1944, the Allied Translation and 
Intelligence Service reported that only 78 of the 1,115 
prisoners they held had surrendered. However, even 
severe wounds did not guarantee a Japanese soldier's life 
would be spared if capture was imminent. Many times, 
wounded soldiers who could not be evacuated easily with 
retreating troops were shot by their own officers or medi­
cal personnel or given hand grenades to kill themselves. 
Only at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 did this 
mindset change. "In November 1944, the emperor was said to
13
have issued an order that should an important place, such 
as the Philippines, fall to the enemy, the commanding 
officer would not be held responsible and should not commit
. . Q R . . . .suicide." "In February 1945, troops m  the Philippines 
received an order not to kill themselves if their position 
became hopeless, but to try to escape since men would be 
needed after the war."JD
Japanese policies and propaganda were not the only 
reasons for the insignificant number of Japanese prisoners; 
the reluctance of American soldiers to capture their 
"treacherous" enemy contributed to this tragic situation as 
well.
The attitude of many American soldiers that "the only 
good Jap is a dead Jap" kept a large number of potential 
prisoners from ever reaching American lines. Some Japa­
nese prisoners reported that they had tried to surrender 
several times, but "every time American soldiers saw a Jap 
they would shoot at him and so [they] had no opportunity to
O Osurrender." An American report backed this statement up, 
noting that "documents pertaining to Japanese prisoners 
were 'full of accounts of ingenious schemes devised by 
POW's to avoid being shot while trying to give themselves 
up' due to the fact of 'surrender being made difficult by 
the unwillingness to take prisoners' on the part of Allied
O Qfighting men." Another American report stated that "a 
Marine Raider Battalion, while on a patrol, ran across a
14
Japanese Hospital bivouac area. Over four hundred, includ­
ing patients and corpsmen were killed, but although large 
amounts of Hospital supplies and equipment were captured, 
no prisoners were taken.
Although official U.S. government policy required that 
prisoners be taken whenever possible, many commanding 
officers refused to pass along these orders, explaining 
"There's too much risk attached to taking prisoners and I'm 
not going to ask any of my men to take any . . . .
Others took an even harder line against prisoners. On at 
least one occasion, a "commanding officer censured his men 
from a lower unit for bringing in prisoners, saying-- 
'Don't bother to take prisoners, shoot the sons of 
bitches!'"42 "Admiral William Halsey, soon to become the 
commander of the South Pacific Force, vowed after Pearl 
Harbor that by the end of the war Japanese would be spoken 
only in hell, and rallied his men thereafter under such 
slogans as 'Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs.'"^ 
Because of attitudes such as these, horrifying incidences 
were reported without official reprimand. One, involving 
the U.S. submarine Wahoo, is a prime example. After sink­
ing a freighter and a transport from a four-ship convoy, 
"Mush" Morton, the skipper of Wahoo, brought his vessel to
the surface:
15
The water was so thick with enemy soldiers 
that it was literally impossible to cruise 
through them without pushing them aside like 
driftwood. These were the troops we knew had 
been bound for New Guinea, to fight and kill 
our own men, and Mush, whose overwhelming 
biological hatred of the enemy we were only now 
beginning to sense, looked about him with 
exultation at the carnage . . . .
"There must be close to ten thousand of 
them in the water," said Roger Paine's voice.
"I figure about nine thousand five hundred 
of the sons-a-bitches," Morton calculated.
Whatever the number, Morton was determined 
to kill every single one. He ordered the deck 
guns to open fire. Some of the Japanese,
Morton said later, returned the fire with 
pistol shots. To Morton, this signaled 'fair 
game.'. . . . Later, Morton reported tersely,
"After about an hour of this, we destroyed all 
the boats and most of the troops."
A vicious circle had developed in which the Japanese 
reluctance to surrender and Allied disinterest in taking 
prisoners had meshed sickeningly, with horrifying 
results.Thus, "by the final year of the war, one out of 
four U.S. combatants stated that his primary goal was not 
to help bring about Japan's surrender, but simply to kill 
as many Japanese as possible.
The callous attitude of the Americans developed in 
many ways. Some front-line soldiers were terrified of 
Japanese treachery. The 2nd Marine Battalion had captured 
several prisoners on Guadalcanal. The prisoners rubbed 
their bellies and asked for food. When food was offered, 
they said that their whole unit was hungry and wanted to 
surrender. The battalion followed their captives until 
they reached a ravine. There the prisoners explained that
16
the trip would take a long time and suggested that the unit 
rest up for a bit. As the Americans settled down and 
removed their gear, they were fired upon by the very Japa­
nese they had set out to capture. Many were slaughtered 
and those who made it back were reprimanded for losing 
their friends and much of their gear. Few were ready to 
trust a surrendering Japanese soldier again. ^
Others had heard of such Japanese atrocities and were 
eager to return the favor. Charles Lindbergh noted the 
common feeling that "a Japanese soldier who cuts off an 
American soldier's head [was] an Oriental barbarian, 'lower 
than a rat', [but] an American soldier who slits a Japanese 
throat 'did it only because he knew the Japs had done it to
A Q . .his buddies.'" Even Time magazine displayed this atti­
tude, noting that "low flying fighters turned lifeboats 
towed by motor barges, and packed with Jap survivors, into
bloody sieves. Loosed on the Japs was the same ferocity
• . 4 Qwhich they had often displayed."
Souvenir hounds joined in the melee as well, eager to
smuggle stolen items back home and knowing that they could
not pilfer a living prisoner's belongings. One officer at
the front observed that "a Japanese officer, having his
sword on him, had as much chance of being captured alive as
a sheep chased by a pack of wolves" because of the American
• . R o"mania" for owning a Japanese saber.
17
This callousness towards prisoners had severe reper­
cussions and was extremely hard to break. "It took the 
promise of three days leave and some ice cream to bring in 
the first Army prisoner. This broke the ice but the flow 
of prisoners was still s l o w . I n  August, 1944, Lindbergh 
was informed that "'the officers wanted some prisoners to 
question but couldn't get any until they offered two weeks 
leave in Sydney for each one turned in. Then they got more 
than they could handle.' But when they cut out giving 
leave, the prisoners stopped coming in. The boys just said 
they couldn't catch any.'"
Even when a prisoner was captured, this did not guar­
antee his safe escort to the U.S. R.J. Maness, a Marine 
corporal who fought in the Pacific, admitted that "some 
Japanese smarted off and did not make it back. Any of our 
men that killed Japanese after they were captured were 
violating battalion policy, but it was done." In another 
battalion, an officer noted that "even when prisoners were 
taken . . . , they were lined up and asked which ones
could speak English. Those who were able to speak English 
were taken for questioning. The others 'simply weren't 
taken.'" Official papers also show that "on several 
occasions, word was telephoned in from the front line that 
a prisoner had been taken, only to find after hours of 
waiting that the prisoner had 'died' enroute to the rear.
In more than one instance there was strong evidence that
18
the prisoner had been shot and buried because it was too
• • R 5much bother to take him m."
Even when a prisoner was captured and sent to the 
rear, it was still not certain that he would be shipped to 
the U.S. Although the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary 
of War had signed an agreement saying that all prisoners 
captured by U.S. troops would be transferred to the War 
Department and delivered to the U.S., many exceptions were 
made. On one occasion, General MacArthur made special 
arrangements with the Australian government to have them 
hold "approximately [400] American-owned prisoners of war 
captured in the Pacific fighting" and maintain them through 
a reverse lend lease agreement. On another occasion, the 
Navy made an informal agreement with New Zealand in which 
New Zealand accepted the custody and responsibility of 700 
U.S. Navy POW's, just as if New Zealand had captured them. 
The Navy explained that the prisoners were captured in the 
Solomon Islands and were transferred to the New Zealand 
government because there was no safe, reliable transport 
back the U.S. Those prisoners valuable for interrogation 
purposes, however, were ultimately to be transported to
cr Oallied interrogation facilities in Australia. Since no 
deals relating to the transfer of POW's were made at a 
national level with either New Zealand or Australia and 
since most of the field records have been destroyed, few 
records exist of the transactions made and many of the
19
records that do exist give conflicting results. For this
reason, and since it was difficult to determine which
prisoners were captured by each individual government
during a joint campaign, no exact count can be given of the
U.S. prisoners held by other countries and even less is
• ■ 5 9known about the exact details of their captivity.
Other prisoners were held in Hawaii, Saipan, Leyte,
Luzon, and Mindanao.60 In fact, as of 11 July 1945, the
U.S. had captured approximately 14,000 prisoners, and at
least 8,664 Japanese prisoners were held by or for the
ft 9United States outside of its continental boundaries.
Although 14,000 prisoners may sound like a large 
group, the number of prisoners captured in the Pacific was 
less than a fraction of the prisoners who poured into the 
U.S. from Europe and not all of the captured Japanese 
prisoners were front-line soldiers. U.S. War Department 
Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, stated that "the 
Armed Forces of the belligerent parties may consist of 
combatants and noncombatants. In the case of capture by 
the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of 
war." In addition, "Individuals who follow armed forces 
without directly belonging thereto, such as correspondents, 
newspaper reporters, sutlers, contractors, who fall into 
the enemy's hands and whom the latter thinks expedient to 
detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of 
war, provided they are in possession of a certificate from
20
the military authorities of the armed forces which they
were accompanying."0  ^ Although the Japanese did not plan
for the capture of their men and these documents were not
provided, most front-line soldiers did not know about the
reguired certificate and gave no consideration as to wheth-
• • 6 ^er their captive was military or not.
Thus, prisoners captured ranged from first-rate front­
line forces to illiterate laborers and Koreans, and from 
medical personnel to Japanese "comfort girls," the latter 
creating quite a bit of commotion among their guards.
There was even a woman sniper, captured on Eniwetok, and a 
few Japanese-Americans who had chosen to fight for Japan.66 
The average prisoner, however, "from the beginning of the 
New Guinea campaign up to May 1944 was of average or above 
average standard of education, under 30, from a 'city 
occupation' (artisans or clerks), single, enlisted in the 
Army, and was captured rather than surrendering of his own 
free will."67
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS
Although the first prisoners who were captured in 
World War II caught the U.S. off guard, the Navy quickly 
issued clear-cut directives concerning their care. In 
fact, the first letter of instructions on the handling of 
prisoners was issued on Decembeir 5, 1941, two days before 
Pearl Harbor. These instructions were accompanied by a 27- 
page questionnaire to assist in formal interrogations if 
they were ever required.^ A revision, based upon British 
Naval policy and updating the procedures, was written May 
19, 1942.2
According to these updated instructions, Naval 
commanders were to ensure that prisoners were segregated 
into three groups immediately as they were received on 
board. These groups were divided into officers, non-com­
missioned officers, and enlisted men, and no member of one 
group was to be permitted to speak with a member of another 
group or with U.S. servicemen, except those specifically 
designated as interpreters. To ensure compliance, and to 
convey the urgency of proper procedures, the instructions 
described problems occurring during the recent capture of a
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submarine crew. The captain of the submarine was given 
permission to speak to his crew and utilized the opportuni­
ty to remind his crew to give no information of value to 
their captors. Although the American crew quickly stopped 
him when they realized what he was saying, the damage was 
already done and his crew remained highly security con­
scious, giving very little information of value to their 
captors.
After being segregated, the prisoners were to be 
searched minutely and everything except necessary clothing 
was to be taken from them, made into separate bundles, and 
marked clearly with the prisoner's name, rank, and serial 
number. This would give the prisoners extra incentive to 
give correct information since the only way they could 
retrieve their possessions was to have it marked with the 
required information. Receipts would be given "if 
demanded." During the search, the instructions noted, 
special care was to be taken to prevent any prisoner from 
throwing any articles overboard or otherwise disposing of 
them. Also, seamen were reminded that souvenirs were not 
to be taken. To keep sailors from stealing items of intel­
ligence value, the Navy implemented a policy whereby arti­
cles received by the Division of Naval Intelligence which 
were determined to have no technical or intelligence value 
would be returned to the commander of the forces involved 
in the capture for distribution.
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Once prisoners had been segregated and completely 
searched, they would be fed, given warm clothing and medi­
cal attention, and provided with such amenities as ciga­
rettes. The instructions were explicit about this; intel­
ligence gathering was more important than the care of the 
prisoners and would be accomplished first.
Officers and interpreters were to stay with the pris­
oners during mealtimes and periods of exercise and relaxa­
tion. This way, they could listen to the prisoners' con­
versations and try to gather information from careless 
comments. If enough men were proficient in the language, 
others would be used as guards for the same reason, al­
though they were never to reveal their knowledge of the 
prisoners' language, since this would have caused the 
prisoners to become more security conscious.
The instructions further ordered that "although some 
prisoners may be taken who are eager to talk under the 
stress and shock of action, capture and possible exposure", 
no attempts were to be made at formal interrogation unless 
a prisoner was suffering from wounds or exposure to such an 
extent that there was doubt that he would survive the trip
O . . .back. In these cases, pertinent portions of a question­
naire were to be used as a guide to gather information the 
prisoner might have possessed.
A roster of prisoners and a statement describing the 
action in which they were taken was to be prepared. Upon
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arrival in port, these documents would be turned over to 
the Commandant of the Naval District or his designated 
representative, along with the prisoners, their personal 
possessions, and any other material gathered in the encoun­
ter. Items of foreign military equipment which were of no 
further use to the prisoners was to be taken and turned 
over to the quartermaster salvage officer. Many items, 
including helmets, cartridge belts, cartridge pouches, 
first aid kits, canteens, and gas masks, were shipped to 
one of the Washington Quartermaster Depots and issued to 
U.S. troops for training. Other salvageable items, such as 
blankets and shelter halves would be kept as well.^
Once the prisoners were transferred to a Naval prison 
camp, they would be assigned a serial number, photographed, 
and fingerprinted; and a basic personnel record would be 
prepared for them. Then, as soon as possible, they were 
transferred to the custody of the Army for final disposi­
tion .
The serial numbers given to the prisoners consisted of 
four components. The first component was the symbol "ISN", 
standing for Internment Serial Number. The second was the 
numerical symbol of the naval district in which the prison­
er was landed and processed and the third was the number of 
the individual prisoner of war. This number was determined 
by counting consecutively, starting with one, the number of 
prisoners received and processed in that district since the
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beginning of the war, without regard to the country the 
prisoner had served. The fourth component was the symbol 
"Na", which designated that the prisoner had been in custo­
dy of the Navy. Thus, the twenty-fifth prisoner of war 
received and processed at a naval shore station in the 
Fourteenth Naval District would be assigned serial number: 
"ISN-14-25(Na)", and the twelfth prisoner received and 
processed in the Thirteenth Naval District would be as­
signed the number: "ISN-13-12(Na)".^
The prisoners were photographed in two positions, full 
face and profile. The prisoner's serial number would 
appear in both positions. At least five sets of each 
picture were printed so that five copies of the prisoner's 
Basic Personnel Record could be created. The prints could 
not be greater than 2" x 2" to accommodate the personnel 
record.
Five sets of fingerprints were also required. This 
could either be accomplished by taking one set of original 
fingerprints and photocopying the rest or by taking five 
sets of original fingerprints, one for each record.
The Basic Personnel Record itself consisted of War 
Department - Provost Marshal General's Office Form No. 1, 
printed and furnished on heavy paper suitable for permanent 
records. It contained the prisoner's serial number, name, 
personal information, the appropriate photographs and 
fingerprints, and an inventory of any personal effects
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taken from the prisoner. Each prisoner would sign the form 
after inventorying his personal effects and ensuring each 
item was listed on the inventory.
Any "untoward incidents" such as a death or injury of 
a prisoner, damage or loss of property of prisoners, es­
capes or attempted escapes, or any other incident likely to 
result in complaints by prisoners occurring during the 
voyage was to be recorded immediately. The Commanding 
Officer of the vessel would then appoint a Board of Inves­
tigation consisting of three or more officers, one of whom 
would be a medical officer. This Board was to conduct a 
hearing according to the principles of military law, call­
ing and examining witnesses, including prisoners of war, 
and determine whether any blame was attributable to the 
personnel of the United States or to the prisoners of war. 
The Board would then make recommendations consistent with 
its findings. If the Board attributed the blame to any 
U.S. personnel or prisoner of war who could be punished 
adequately by disciplinary action, such punishment was 
administered immediately. If the offense was serious 
enough for a court-martial, summaries of evidence were
taken and arrangements were made for essential witnesses to
f)be present at the trial.
Arriving at processing camps like Sand Island, Hawaii 
and Angel Island, California, prisoners held by the Navy 
were transferred to the Army. The officer in command of the
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naval escort party would carry four copies of each of the 
transferred prisoners' Basic Personnel Records with him.
The commanding officer of the Army enclosure to which the 
prisoners were being transferred would check the contents 
of the records against the prisoners and, if everything 
seemed in order, receipt for each prisoner in the space 
provided on the reverse side of each record. He would also 
inventory the prisoner's personal effects, which were 
packaged separately, and accept custody of these as well by 
initialing the appropriate block. He would retain three 
copies of the records and return the fourth copy to the 
commanding officer of the Naval escort party for permanent 
retention by the Navy. This would provide both military 
branches with a written record of the transfer.
Conditions in Army field camps were not quite so 
organized. With no firm guidance, commanders were left to 
make their own decisions on how to properly detain prison­
ers until their transportation to the U.S.
On Guadalcanal, the Japanese were housed in a compound 
built on a former Japanese bivouac area. The prisoners 
cooked their own meals, often from food captured from their 
comrades in arms, over the same fires and in the same iron
Opots they had used before their capture. They were 
dressed in clothing captured by U.S. servicemen and identi­
fied by tags hung on each by means of a looped cord around 
his neck. These tags had been filled out at the division
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collecting point and listed the date of capture, place of 
capture, and the unit that had made the capture as well as 
identifying the wearer as a prisoner. The prisoners were 
warned that if the tag were mutilated, destroyed, or lost, 
they would be provided with no food, but no documentation
9exists as to whether this threat was actually carried out.
Most prisoners were guickly shipped to Army processing 
camps like Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, Califor­
nia. The camp at Sand Island consisted of several wooden 
barracks, only one of which was more than one-story high. 
John Rudolph Sulzer noted on his visit that the barracks 
were "of excellent construction, well-ventilated, well- 
lighted and having shuttered windows. Large spaces are 
left between the beds and in several of the barracks the 
beds are tiered. He noted that electricity had been
installed in each of the barracks as well. Since the camp 
contained several Japanese, German, Italian, and American 
civilians as well as the prisoners, each race was segregat­
ed as agreed upon in the Geneva Convention and the prison­
ers were divided into officers and enlisted and kept sepa­
rated from the civilians as well.
The prisoners prepared their meals in a kitchen pro­
vided exclusively for their use and washed their clothes in 
a laundry which was placed at their disposal three times a 
week. They shopped at a canteen, in which they could buy 
cigarettes, tobacco, magazines, vitamin pills, and phono­
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graph records. The camp was also provided with a library 
and an infirmary, which was served by a Japanese doctor who 
worked under the surveillance of the camp doctor. Serious 
medical cases were taken to the military hospital at Hono­
lulu .
Since Sand Island was a transit camp, the prisoners 
did not work, although they were paid as required by the 
Geneva Convention. Discipline was maintained by an elected 
representative from each barracks. In his report, Sulzer 
noted that the prisoners seemed happy and well cared for.^
The Angel Island processing camp was located on the 
northern end of Angel Island, a small mountainous island at 
the northern tip of San Francisco Bay. It had previously 
served as a quarantine station for the Immigration Service 
and was now part of the military post of Fort McDowell. 
Opened the day the U.S. entered the war, it was set up to 
receive civilian internees. However, the internees were 
soon transferred and replaced by prisoners of war. Having 
a total capacity of 500, it was composed of a brown two- 
story building and a smaller building that served as a 
kitchen and dining area. The buildings were surrounded by 
a single seven-foot chain-link fence, which was topped by 
two feet of barbed wire with no overhang and surrounded on 
all sides by trees. To the north, the fence was within 
eight feet of the main building and nowhere was it more 
than 75 feet from it. Two guard towers were located at
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diagonal corners of the prisoner compound and each time the
■ 12guard changed a count was made of the prisoners.
The prisoners slept on steel or iron three-decker cots 
and were each issued three blankets. Their meals were a 
compromise between American and Japanese food. The cooks 
were Japanese and worked under the direction of an American 
sergeant. They were provided with forty pounds of rice for 
every hundred people per meal. The prisoners also ate 
great quantities of cabbage, which they liked and believed 
was a sort of cure-all. They did not care for milk, but 
drank both coffee and tea. Before September of 1944, the 
prisoners were served rice with every meal, but during an 
inspection of the camp by the International Red Cross that 
month, they requested that they receive rice only twice a 
day and be served bread for the third meal. Their request
was granted and, after that, they received bread or toast
• 1 3with breakfast.
The prisoners received an exacting set of rules that 
described their daily schedule and listed required duties 
and restrictions (see Appendix 1). There were few disci­
plinary problems. For recreation, the prisoners engaged in 
baseball, volleyball, wrestling, or games of Mah-jongg.
They liked to gamble and often used tobacco as stakes.
They also spent time indoors reading, although there were 
no books in Japanese until after September of 1944. Being 
a transient camp, there were no educational services or
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canteen. If the prisoners desired anything normally carried 
in a canteen, they would prepare a list and the items were 
purchased from the American post exchange. When the pris­
oners received the items, their accounts were debited the 
cost of the articles.^
While Sand Island served as just a temporary detain­
ment camp, Angel Island, which was the main transit camp on 
the west coast of the continental U.S., was more than it 
seemed. In addition to being a temporary detainment camp 
and processing center, it also served as a facade for a
nearby interrogation center which was so secret even its
■ • ■ 15name was classified, Byron Hot Springs.
Once prisoners arrived at the processing camps like 
Sand Island, Hawaii and Angel Island, California, Army 
procedures became more organized. Although no one at Angel 
Island had prepared a written Standard Operating Procedure 
for processing prisoners as of September 29, 1944, a proce­
dure had been perfected by trial and error. Prisoners were 
received from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
Before the prisoners left the ship, Angel Island personnel 
obtained a passenger or sailing list and mimeographed 
several copies of it. These copies were furnished to 
personnel in the receiving room, the photo lab, the supply 
room, and the PW personnel section, as well as to the 
billeting non-com, the canteen officer, the medical offi­
cer, the sergeant of the guard, and the mess officer.
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Then, as the prisoners left the ship, they were searched 
by the Port Provost Marshal. All of their possessions, 
including the articles that were to be confiscated, were 
placed with their baggage and tagged, to be delivered 
separately from the prisoners themselves. The prisoners 
were directed through a disinfestation plant and underwent 
a complete medical exam at this t i m e . E a c h  prisoner 
stripped and took a shower while all of their clothing was 
treated with ethyl bromide in a nearby gas chamber. Fol­
lowing this, the escorting officer and the prison officer 
conducted a thorough inspection of each prisoner with a 
flood light and all of their hairy body parts were sprayed 
with an insecticide. The inspection was to check each 
prisoner for body lice, check their throat and teeth for 
evidence of infection, their eyes for evidence of trachoma 
and conjunctivitis, their skin for evidence of rashes, and 
their genitalia and anus for evidence of venereal 
disease. They were then counted and marched to the
processing room with only the clothes on their back. Here,
personnel records were initiated and serial numbers as-
1 fisigned, if either had not already been accomplished. The 
Army's serial numbers, however, were composed differently 
than those of the Navy.
If assigned in the field, the first component of the 
serial number consisted of three symbols, a number desig­
nating a command within the appropriate theater, a letter
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designating the theater of operations in which the prisoner 
was captured, and the first letter of the country in whose 
armed forces the prisoner was serving. The second compo­
nent was assigned consecutively, according to the number of 
prisoners captured in the command of the appropriate thea­
ter regardless of which country he had served. Thus, the 
35th prisoner captured in the Southwest Pacific, if serving 
in the Japanese Army, would be assigned 42SJ-35.
Prisoners transferred to the continental U.S. without being 
processed in the field were given numbers composed in a 
slightly different manner. Serial numbers assigned at the 
Service Command consisted of a number representing the 
appropriate Service Command - one through nine, the letter 
"W", representing the War Department, the first letter of 
the country he had served, and the prisoner number which 
was assigned consecutively by the Service Command regard­
less of which country he had served or where he had been
1 Qcaptured.
If a personnel record had already been completed on a 
prisoner, it was checked for the legibility of the finger­
prints and to ensure that there had been no major changes 
in the prisoner's appearance. If the prints were illegible 
or if the prisoner's appearance had changed materially, a 
notation was made on the record and an appointment set for 
a new photo or new set of fingerprints to be taken. Each 
prisoner was given a numbered bottle and instructed how to
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collect a small specimen of his feces. Direct stool cul­
tures were plated and malaria smears made using the number 
from the bottle. The prisoners received immunizations for 
typhoid and vaccinations for smallpox. At this time, all 
of the Japanese prisoners chose to sign a statement saying 
that they did not want their relatives or their government 
informed of their capture. This was allowed since the 
United States wished to abide by the Geneva Convention, but 
also wanted to keep the prisoners happy. Since each pris­
oner signed the statement, there was no mail to or from the
• 2 2 prisoners at Angel Island.
The extremely sick and wounded prisoners were taken to 
Letterman General Hospital, but "in the interest of effi­
ciency and economy of manpower", their non-medical records 
were not transferred to that station. Thus, while the 
medical records went to the hospital with the prisoner, all 
pay and administrative procedures were still accomplished 
by Angel Island personnel. Only those who were extremely 
sick or wounded were transferred, however. A Red Cross 
report from September 16, 1944 showed that of 450 prisoners 
remaining at Angel Island, fifty-one had syphilis, twelve 
had some kind of skin disease, and twenty-five had war 
wounds whose bandages required changing daily. Several 
others had intestinal worms or carried dysentery germs.
The report also suggested that although blood tests had
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shown only a few cases of malaria, there were probably many 
other cases that had not shown positive on the test.^
While the prisoners were processed, their baggage was 
thoroughly searched. The prison spokesman, the section 
leader of the prisoners whose baggage was being searched, 
the receiving and property officer, and an interpreter were 
all present during this search. Articles to be confiscated 
were taken at this time and receipts were prepared for any
o 5money or valuables removed from the baggage.
The fact that conditions were more orderly than in the 
field did not, however, mean that every detail went accord­
ing to plan. Interrogators in the U.S. often complained 
that prisoners they received were "stale" and almost worth­
less for interrogation purposes. Also, in a letter to 
Commander Riheldaffer, who worked closely with Byron Hot 
Springs, E. J. Allen, a Navy interrogator there, showed 
nothing but contempt for the "routine of handling prisoners 
in [the] custody of the Army." He described the routine as 
follows:
When the P/Ws were taken from the van which had 
transported them from the ship they were herded 
into a room preparatory to getting deloused.
There were two young Japanese Nisei to be used 
as interpreters; however, they were quite 
useless, as they could not talk the language 
sufficiently to keep things orderly. The 
result was much confusion, with the officers 
and Nisei making signs to have the P/Ws get 
their clothing off. The captain in charge 
assigned six enlisted men to search their 
clothing. These men had not previous experi­
ence and I could not refrain from making some
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suggestions which resulted in producing an 
array of razor blades, knives, etc., hidden in 
the inner soles of the P/Ws' shoes and in the 
seams of their hats and trousers.
The entire procedure in my opinion, was 
handled very clumsily. Papers and articles 
taken from these prisoners were thrown away and 
no provision was made to turn them back to the 
owners. Goods were thrown in a big pile and 
then stuffed into prisoners' bags, regardless 
of ownership. b
While not all inprocessing worked in this manner, sometimes 
it did occur. Prisoners were supposed to be in the proc­
essing camps only long enough to be processed in and then 
moved on to a permanent camp, but sometimes this did not
work according to plan either. At least on one occasion, a
2 7prxsoner was held at Sand Island for over a year. As 
time went on, however, things became better organized and 
problems such as these became fewer.
When the prisoners had been completely inprocessed and 
interrogated, they were ready to be shipped to their perma­
nent camp. For the Japanese prisoners, from April 1943 
until February 1945, this meant Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.
When the majority of the prisoners were ready for depar­
ture, the Post Transportation Officer requested a Main 
number and routing from Washington, D.C. and made the 
necessary accommodations with the railroad for the trip, as 
prisoners were not allowed to fly on commercial airlines. 
Orders were published and the orders, as well as the rout­
ing, time of departure, and estimated time of arrival, were 
mailed to the POW Camp involved as well as the Commanding
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Generals of each Service Command involved.
When the train arrived, the cars to be used to trans­
port the prisoners were inspected. If possible, this was 
accomplished the day before, but was sometimes done the day 
of the trip. Prison type cars were used, if available, but 
if not available, care was taken that cars with blind spots 
or compartments were not used. "Jumpers", cars whose 
generators were defective and which used electricity gener­
ated by another car by means of heavy electrical cables, 
were also rejected. Fire extinguishers were removed from 
each car and the glass cases containing fire fighting 
equipment were covered with cardboard. The door of one 
toilet was locked securely and the door to the other was 
removed so that the guard inside the car could see all of 
the prisoners all of the time. Windows were blocked so 
that they could not be raised more than four inches. 
Finally, two coal lamps were suspended from the baggage 
racks of each car to be used as auxiliary lighting devices 
and a car loading schedule was furnished to the train
O Ocommander by the Transportation Officer.
After being informed that they would not be allowed to
reenter the barracks, the prisoners were assembled in the
recreation area, carrying their baggage and memorandum
receipt property, which was the U.S. government property
issued to them for use during their internment. Their 
baggage was taken into the searching room and searched and
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the memorandum receipt property was inspected for deliber­
ate damage or loss and taken up. If deliberate damage or 
loss was identified, the prisoner was charged for the 
property. The prisoners were then marched through the 
Processing Room, where their identification was checked and 
a body search made. They then proceeded to the Searching 
Room, picked up their baggage, and marched out of the 
enclosure to the train. The prison officer and the train 
commander checked to ensure the proper number of prisoners 
as they boarded the train.
Two guards rode in each car with the prisoners. They 
had written orders to command "Halt" and then to fire 
immediately on any prisoner attempting escape. Interpret­
ers explained the meaning of "Halt" and communicated all 
rules and procedures to the prisoners before the trip 
began. The guards were also to stop the train and call out 
the guard during any riot or escape attempt. Prisoners 
were to remain seated when the train was moving, unless 
given permission by a guard to leave their seat. Even 
then, only one prisoner could leave his seat at a time. 
Prisoners were not to be allowed to use the latrine when 
the train was stopped or slowing down to stop, but were 
allowed to use them at any other time. Loud singing or 
other such noises were forbidden. Strict military disci­
pline was maintained and prisoners were required to be 
courteous and respectful toward U.S. personnel at all
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times. The train commander was responsible for discipline
and if punishment was ever required for an offense, a
report of the offense and punishment were given to the
internment camp commander along with the prisoner when the
train arrived. Prisoners were not to be tied or handcuffed
"unless absolutely necessary either for the protection of
o Qthe prisoners or to prevent escape." They were allowed 
to smoke, but since they were not allowed to have matches, 
lights had to be furnished by supernumeraries or non-com­
missioned officers. The guards assumed their duties before 
the prisoners entered the train and their job was not 
finished until they delivered the prisoners, properly
aligned and together, to their relief. In this manner, the
• 3 0prisoners were transported to their permanent camp.
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CHAPTER THREE
OUR SECRET INTERROGATION CENTERS
In addition to the processing centers and the perma­
nent prisoner of war camps, the U.S. also had two secret 
interrogation centers, one at Fort Hunt in Washington, D.C. 
and one at Byron Hot Springs, California. These interroga­
tion centers were used to conduct detailed interrogations 
of the most knowledgeable of the prisoners brought into the 
U.S. Although interrogations were conducted in the field, 
these were primarily to gain tactical knowledge for immedi­
ate use on the battlefield. Early in the war, critical 
information of long term strategic value was often lost or 
discarded before it reached the strategic planners in the 
U.S. The proposed interrogation centers would help to 
correct this situation.^
In early 1942, the Secretaries of the Army and Navy
agreed to establish two interrogation centers, one on the
2east coast and one on the west coast. The interrogation 
centers were to be placed under the control of the Provost 
Marshal General, but made available to the Military Intel­
ligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence for 
the interrogation of prisoners. The Chiefs of the Army and
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Navy Interrogation Sections were responsible for providing 
the interrogation personnel while the Provost Marshal 
General was to designate the commander and provide the 
necessary supplies, equipment, and personnel for their 
operation. Later, because of the inefficiency of the dual 
system, the system was revised and the senior Military 
Intelligence Service Officer was designated as Commanding 
Offxcer as well.
The centers were not classified as prisoner of war 
camps, but rather "as Temporary Detention Centers for the 
specific purpose only of interrogating certain prisoners of 
war captured either by the Army or Navy." The Provost 
Marshal General was to be responsible for ensuring that the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention were upheld and all 
other commanders involved were to ensure that he received 
the reports necessary to accomplish his task.^
The initial configuration determined, representatives 
of the Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2, and the Provost 
Marshal General were sent to locate suitable sites for the 
centers. After looking at several sites, the representa­
tives on the east coast recommended Swannanoa, a vast 
estate near Staunton, Virginia, and the representatives on 
the west coast recommended Byron Hot Springs, a private 
health resort near San Francisco. While Swannanoa was 
rejected and the center on the east coast placed at Fort 
Hunt, Byron Hot Springs was approved on April 25, 1942.
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Byron Hot Springs was two-hundred and ten acres of 
slightly rolling terrain surrounded by a wheat farm.
Entered by way of a private macadam road, it was hidden 
from any public roads or nearby houses. The surrounding 
area was almost desolate and the only nearby town contained 
only a few dozen people, providing almost complete privacy. 
On the grounds were several sulpher springs and a small 
group of buildings. The main building was a four story 
brick hotel containing fifty bedrooms, each averaging 11' 
by 12' with a private toilet, washbasin, and outside expo­
sure, a kitchen, game room, barber shop, two indoor mineral 
baths, and several other large rooms. Surrounding the 
hotel were two dorms, each containing a set of showers, a 
bathroom and twenty 8' by 10' rooms, several cottages with 
between one and eight rooms each as well as a bathroom or 
washstand, a nine car automobile shed, two brick bath­
houses, an old farmhouse, the owner's home, and several 
other miscellaneous sheds and buildings.
Mrs. Reed, the owner of the property, refused to sell 
the property as she regarded it as a memorial to her first 
husband. It was he who had seen Indians taking baths in 
the sulpher springs on the land in 1868 and decided to 
establish a health resort on the area. However, she was 
"willing to give the property to the Army for the duration 
of the war and enter into a ninety-nine year lease thereaf­
ter with an agreement to leave it to the Army by will upon
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fther death." This sounded good to the representatives, 
except that Mrs. Reed had already leased the property on a 
ninety-nine year term to a retired Navy doctor. Mrs. Reed 
explained that this would be no problem as the doctor was 
unable to keep up with the rent and would soon have to give 
up the property anyway. Reports rndrcate that condemna­
tion proceedings were instituted and possession of the 
property was effective 1 June 1942. Construction to pre-
opare the site for its new task was begun immediately. 
Workers built false ceilings to cover a maze of wires that 
would be connected to listening devices and false parti­
tions to provide listening spaces between the walls of 
rooms that would house the prisoners. Windows of wired 
glass construction were installed and barred with heavy 
steel. Locks were put on the doors and a fence erected to
Q .surround the area. Other buildings were turned into 
officers' quarters, MP barracks, barracks for MIS interro­
gators, a laundry, a guardhouse, a post exchange, and a 
myriad of other structures necessary to a military post.^ 
Construction was completed in December of 1942 and Byron 
Hot Springs accepted its first prisoners January 1, 1943.^ 
This first shipment, containing ten prisoners, was 
received directly from Hawaii. One was an aviator observer 
from one of the three planes attached to the battleship 
Kirishima. Two others were from the destroyer Shirakumo 
and the final seven were from the cruiser Furutaka, which
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was sunk off of Guadalcanal in October of 1942. These 
prisoners "were exceedingly cooperative and showed little 
trace of being security conscious." However, soon after, 
the camp received sixteen new prisoners. These prisoners 
had been captured as far back as February 24, 1942 and 
came from the relative ease and comparative freedom of Camp 
Livingston. They included the senior ranking Japanese 
prisoner in the United States, Commander Kunizo Aiso of the 
Hiryu, and were, in nearly every case, quite careful about 
giving any statements helpful to their captors. The inter­
rogators learned from this that prisoners must be interro­
gated soon after capture or they would become security
13conscious and their information stale and worthless.
Because of this, the interrogation centers soon de­
veloped a system of screening prisoners while still in the 
theater of operations and as they arrived in the U.S. 
Particularly knowledgeable prisoners with long term techni­
cal or strategic information were to be flown to the U.S. 
for interrogation. "In theory, this procedure was excel­
lent, but was restricted in practice, by the claim of the 
CSDIC - UK [Combined Services Direct Interrogation Center - 
United Kingdom.] At no time during the operation of the 
American section of CSDIC(AFHQ) was an equitable distribu­
tion of prisoners of war established."^  Thus, most of 
the selection process was accomplished at the U.S. ports of 
entry. While inprocessing at the Angel Island Processing
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Center in California, prisoners were given a "registration
form." This form asked for the prisoner's "name, rank and
internment serial number, his birthplace, the complete
inscription of his identification tag, his place of resi-
1 Rdence, civilian occupation, etc." In most cases, the 
prisoners did not realize they could not be forced to 
answer the questions nor did they understand the reason 
behind the questions, so they filled in the requested 
information, believing the form was an essential part of 
the inprocessing. However, screening teams, usually made 
up of one officer and four Nisei, used the forms to elimi­
nate those prisoners least eligible for interrogation, 
allowing them more time to further screen more eligible 
prisoners. These prisoners were interrogated briefly 
following delousing and other sanitary procedures and 
information gathered on their past history, capture, and 
previous interrogations. Finally, all prisoners were 
classified as A, B, or C. Those classified as C were 
determined to have no information of value and not consid­
ered for interrogation. They were supposed to be shipped 
to Camp Stoneman, another holding area nearby, to keep them 
from mingling with the other prisoners, but because of 
problems at Stoneman, this was never done until after 
February, 1945.^
Prisoners classified as either A or B were selected 
because of their knowledge of a particular region,
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technical knowledge, or because of their civilian or mili­
tary experience. They were moved immediately to Byron Hot 
Springs by train for further interrogation. During the
trip, absolute silence was enforced and blinds or curtains 
1 8drawn.
Upon arrival at Byron Hot Springs, the prisoners were 
kept separated and not allowed to communicate with anyone 
except their interrogation officer. This was continued 
until their first interrogation was completed, so interro­
gations were quickly accomplished. The interrogation 
officer checked the assessment of the first classification 
and ensured that his prisoners were placed in the room that 
would be most helpful to their captors. Normally, two 
men were assigned to a room. Their voices or dialects were 
to differ enough that unseen listeners could distinguish 
between them. They were to be from different ships or, if 
that were not possible, from different branches of the ship 
so that they would be unable to fabricate stories to tell 
the interrogators. "Toughs" were separated so they would 
not spoil the others and sometimes prisoners who had been
at the camp for a while would be chosen as stool pigeons
2 0and assigned with a new prisoner to get him talking.
While the prisoners were arriving and room assignments 
determined, teams checked the rooms to which they were 
assigned to ensure that no messages or warnings had been 
left by the former occupant. These teams were warned to
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check for messages written on walls, pinpricked into wood­
work, left in the toilet, rolled into toilet paper or
hidden inside the cardboard centers, or taped beneath the
■ ? 1window ledges.
Once prisoners had been placed in their rooms, one 
officer studied the material taken from the prisoners.
Then a meeting of the interrogation officers was held.
Here, the prisoners were discussed and information gathered 
from the screening and from the prisoner's personal items 
were shared with the group. Upon the basis of this infor­
mation, the prisoners were assigned to the Air Section, the 
Geographic Section, the Army Section, etc. The head of the 
section then assigned the prisoner to an individual inter­
rogation officer who worked for the section. Naval prison­
ers were first provided to interrogators from the Navy, 
then released to the Army for further interrogation or 
final processing. However, when the Army Air Corps discon­
tinued its duties in anti-submarine warfare, the Army 
relinquished its rights to interrogate Naval prisoners as 
well.^
Each individual interrogator gathered all of the 
information available on the prisoner he was to interrogate 
and studied it for several hours. He was to try to create 
the impression of omniscience and this often required from 
three to six hours of preparation for each hour of interro­
gation. Then, working from a daily schedule prepared by
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the Chief Interrogation Officer, he had the prisoner ordered
9 9into the interrogation room. Normally, the best sub­
jects for interrogation were the petty officers, who, 
although having considerable knowledge of a technical 
nature and some intelligence, were less apt to be as secu­
rity conscious as officers. Therefore, since background 
information was extremely useful in gaining further infor­
mation, the schedule normally began with the youngest and 
most stupid members of the crew, followed by the officers, 
the junior ratings in ascending order of intelligence, and, 
finally, the Petty officers."^
A guard, "who should be smart, of good build,
9 Rsalute well, and stand at attention" would lead the 
prisoner into the room, which was designed to create a 
formal and serious impression and to make the prisoner ill- 
at-ease. The prisoner was to stand at attention, give the 
customary Japanese bow, and then remain standing at atten­
tion until the interrogation officer released him from this 
formality. The interrogators were warned not to ease the 
formal attitude until they were sure that the prisoner 
would not take advantage of the absence of it. The door to 
the room was to be closed immediately and kept closed 
throughout the interrogation. No person, no matter how 
high their rank, was to be allowed to interfere with the
proceedings. This allowed the interrogator to maintain the
9position of power in the room.
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Each interrogator was provided with a fictitious name
that resembled his own enough to cover in case someone
slipped and called him by his actual name, but which would
protect him from repercussions once a prisoner was free.
He was to show no sign of nervousness or hurriedness and
was to be prepared "to recount imaginary experiences or
• . ? 7visits to different places" to get the prrsoner talking.
He was to frequently take brief notes on technical informa­
tion or personal names for use during the rest of the 
investigation and to encourage the prisoner to believe
n othat no other record was being made of the interrogation.
The interrogators were each allowed to use their own 
particular styles, but they normally began their interroga­
tions by asking questions based on information given by the 
prisoner on his registration form, like the circumstances 
of his capture. This allowed the interrogators to check
the veracity of what each prisoner said and made the pris-
. • 7 9oner realize that his statements were being checked.
With this accomplished, the interrogation was normally
broken into six main stages. The first stage focused on
the prisoner's "general schooling, business, sympathies and
antipathies in regard to politics, economics, and Japanese
social life." This gave the interrogator an idea of how
freely the prisoner would talk and also allowed him to play
on the prisoner's prejudices in later interrogations.
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The second stage obtained a broad outline of his 
career and, more particularly, his unit's recent movements. 
This was used to build a basis for future interrogations by 
allowing the prisoner to talk about things he felt were not 
of vital importance and to allow the interrogator to fur­
ther check the information the prisoner was giving. If a 
prisoner refused to answer a particular question, the 
interrogator would not press the point, but return to the 
subject at a later time. However, he would not immediately 
move on, but allow the prisoner to be put even more ill-at- 
ease by the period of silence.
Later stages discussed places the prisoner had visited 
to determine his interests, the amount of time he had spent 
in each area, what he had heard about the war in Europe, 
Africa, and the Pacific, the importance the Japanese as­
signed to each action, and what they were trying to conceal 
or minimize.He was then to be pressed for minute details 
and the Japanese plan of action as he or his friends under- 
stood it. Although questionnaires were prepared to give 
the interrogators a focus for the interrogation, following
the questionnaires to the letter was highly discouraged;
• *3 ?they were meant only as a guide.
Depending on the personality of the prisoner and his 
reluctance to speak in the presence of others, monitors 
would either come into the room and take notes on the 
interrogation or record the interrogation by using a micro­
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phone hidden in the room. When the interrogation was over, 
the interrogator would give a signal, normally a light 
flash or a buzzer, and a guard would enter the room and 
relieve him of the prisoner. The prisoner was then escort­
ed back to his room where his conversation was monitored to 
determine his reaction and to hear any information he 
discussed with his roommate. The interrogator would then 
draft a report of the interrogation, using the documents he 
had studied, notes or recordings made of the interrogation, 
any conversation monitored in the prisoner's room, and, if 
available, reports from a stool pigeon. This report was 
supposed to give the interrogator's estimate of the 
prisoner's personality and reliability, military history 
and background, an outline of the topics covered in the 
interrogation, specific information, such as proper names 
or localities, and technical information learned, special 
points of interest for monitors, and suggested lines for 
further interrogation. Once completed, the report was sent 
to a special section for evaluation and editing and for­
warded to the appropriate authorities."^
Byron Hot Springs personnel also gathered information 
in ways other than direct interrogation. One method used, 
mentioned previously, was the technigue of secretly moni­
toring the prisoner's rooms. This method was declared 
"Most Secret and not divulged to anyone outside the 
Centre." When the Chief Interrogating Officer and the
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Navy Chief Interrogator made room assignments, they also 
selected, with help from the Chief Monitor, which rooms 
would be constantly monitored. Normal monitoring hours ran 
from 7:00am to 10:00pm, although special circumstances 
sometimes required longer hours. Three groups of monitors 
divided the day into five hour shifts of monitoring, tran­
scribing, and off-duty time. Recordings were made on 
either glass-base or fiber-base phonograph records and were 
transcribed in the original language, with doubtful words 
and missing phrases duly marked. Once complete, the tran­
scription was evaluated, edited, and translated. Pertinent 
material was extracted or combined with other related 
material and disseminated to the appropriate authorities.
To keep the process secret, information was "disguised as
to imply that the information was given to interrogators "
• ■ 17and placed under the headrng "They are Sayrng."
Stool pigeons, or "cooperative guests" were also 
utilized. The prisoners used were to be thoroughly reli­
able, good actors, quick-witted, and have a retentive 
memory and versatile conversational powers. They were to 
be employed only when necessary in order to avoid detec­
tion. Normally, stool pigeons were placed under the direc­
tion of an officer handler and "paid" with extra privileges 
or rations or other amenities. They were fully briefed on 
information to be sought and then allowed to use their own 
methods to gain it. A stool pigeon was often placed in the
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same room as the intended subject or in the exercise pen to 
become friendly with an obstinate prisoner. Drawbacks to 
this system were that stool pigeons were often sensitive to 
any curtailment of their extra privileges and interrogators 
with stool pigeons tended to get lazy. Even so, much 
information that could have been gained in no other way was
3 oobtained by the use of stool pigeons.
Some "guests" were even taken into San Francisco for a 
ride and dinner. This provided the prisoners with a chance 
to get away from the interrogation center and the interro­
gators with an opportunity to extract information from the 
prisoner after "their first slight contact with society and 
drinks." A final method used was to take prisoners to 
U.S. naval vessels or military installations to allow them 
to make comparisons to the Japanese equivalents.^ Both of 
these methods were extremely sensitive and only used with 
dependable prisoners.
Although most of these techniques were probably ques­
tionable, according to the Geneva Convention, the only 
direct violation occurring at Byron Hot Springs dealt with 
German prisoners and was quickly dealt with by senior 
officers. Five German prisoners under trial for the murder 
of another were at Tracy so that the U.S. could obtain 
additional information about the murder. "During the 
interrogation it was reported by the prisoners that coer­
cive methods were used, viz., long periods standing at
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attention, extra rides in a motor vehicle at night, use 
of a gas mask on which an onion had been rubbed, inocula­
tions, and other physical discomitures.  ^ Colonel Bliss, 
the commander, was sent an official request for an investi­
gation and immediately directed to find out who was at 
fault. He was further directed to determine if those at 
fault would accept a reprimand from the branch commander in 
order to keep the situation from becoming an international 
incident.^
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c h a p t e r f o u r
THE PERMANENT CAMPS
As prisoners began to arrive in the U.S., officials 
quickly shuttled them to former Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC) camps and civilian internment centers. These camps 
could not be located within fifty miles of the U.S.-Canadi­
an border, the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, ordnance depots, 
or manufacturing plants handling high explosives. They 
were not to be within thirty miles of the Great Lakes, 
twenty miles of certain listed industrial installations, or 
within a Vital Air Defense Zone. Additional regulations 
required the camps not be built in a number of large cities 
and, in a few cases, entire states.^ Separate camps were 
to be provided for each major nationality of the Axis 
powers, with the Germans being separated further into anti- 
Nazi Army prisoners, other Army prisoners, anti-Nazi Naval 
prisoners, and other Naval prisoners.
While later in the war, standard operating procedures 
were set up for every detail of the prisoners' capture, 
transfer, and internment, the first enemy prisoners caught 
the U.S. totally off guard. Kazuo Sakamaki, the first U.S. 
prisoner captured in World War II, was captured December 8, 
1941, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
68
69
The commander of one of five midget submarines involved in 
the attack, Sakamaki found that his submarine's gyrocompass 
would not work. He was unable to enter the harbor and 
encountered some U.S. destroyers. This encounter damaged 
his vessel further. Finally, when the damaged vessel 
became stranded on a coral reef, he and his crew partner 
attempted to scuttle it and began swimming toward what they 
thought was Lanai, their planned rendezvous point with the 
mother submarine. Sakamaki passed out in the cold water 
and regained consciousness only to find Lieutenant P.G. 
Plybon and Corporal David Akui aiming their loaded weapons 
at him. The two, along with a jeep-load of other American 
GI's had been sent to investigate the report of 
"something . . . amiss offshore" and had found Sakamaki
lying on the beach. Sakamaki, clad only in loin-cloth type 
undershorts, was quickly taken to Bellows Field and then to 
Sand Island, where he was interrogated and given a complete 
medical examination. Eight weeks later, in late February, 
he was transferred to the continental U.S. in a locked and 
guarded room on the internment ship Etlon. He stayed at 
the newly constructed interrogation center on Angel Island, 
California for one week and was then transferred to Camp 
McCoy, a German and Japanese internment camp in Wisconsin. 
His first day there, March 9, 1942, Sakamaki was allowed to 
mingle freely with the civilian internees from Japan. 
However, the next day he was removed to his own camp.
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Since the Geneva convention required that captured officers 
be provided an aide and the U.S. had no Japanese enlisted 
prisoners to serve in this capacity, a German internee 
offered to serve. Feeling the shame of being a prisoner, 
Sakamaki refused the aide, but did, however, ask for, and 
was provided with, a pencil, pencil sharpener, notebook, 
library books, and a daily newspaper.
Three months later, Sakamaki was transferred again. 
This time, he was sent to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, another 
internment camp, along with 250 civilian internees from 
Japan. There he attended classes provided for the intern­
ees on English, geography, agriculture, Buddhism, and 
theology. Sakamaki was still the only military prisoner 
held captive in the U.S. The civilian internees in the 
camp were soon repatriated to Japan and on June 30, 1942, 
Sakamaki was transferred a third time, this time to Camp 
Livingston, an internment camp in Louisiana. However, 
Sakamaki was no longer the only military prisoner in the 
U.S. On June 22, nine other Japanese prisoners had arrived 
and by July 1, thirty-two German prisoners had arrived as 
well. By October 1, thirty-seven other Japanese prisoners 
had been transferred to the U.S. and on October 29, three 
Japanese officers, one Warrant officer, and thirty-eight 
enlisted men who had been captured during the battles at 
Wake Island and Midway, in the Aleutian campaign, and from 
miscellaneous patrol boats joined Sakamaki in Livingston.^
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Thus for a while, Sakamaki and his fellow prisoners were 
scattered among several camps, usually sharing their accom­
odations with Japanese-American internees and foreign 
nationals. However, in April, 1943, the U.S. was better 
prepared to hold its new prisoners, so military authorities 
decided to house the Japanese prisoners at Camp McCoy, 
Wisconsin. Camp McCoy had previously been limited to a 
capacity of one hundred prisoners, as it was the training 
center for the 100th Infantry Battalion, a Japanese-Ameri­
can unit and the military did not feel safe placing large 
numbers of prisoners near the unit. However, when the unit 
was transferred to Europe, the Provost Marshal General 
decided to move all of the Japanese prisoners currently in 
the U.S. to the camp, to "allocate any additional Japanese 
prisoners of war who may be received to [the] camp 
and . . . [to] designate it for the permanent internment of
Call prisoners of war of that nationality."Thus, on May 11, 
1943, Sakamaki and the other 61 Japanese prisoners were 
sent to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where the Japanese prisoners 
were to be confined for much of the rest of the war. The 
camp held Japanese internees, German prisoners, and had 
once even held the 100th Battalion, an Army unit made up of 
Japanese-Americans, but it was also now prepared to hold 
the Japanese prisoners.^ The camp was also opened up to 
its full capability of 1000 prisoners, even though there 
were only 62 Japanese prisoners in the continental U.S.
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The interned enemy aliens held at the camp were returned to
the custody of the Department of Justice and then trans-
. . . 7ferred out, leaving the entire camp for prisoners of war.
The prisoner of war compound at McCoy was situated
about four miles from the Army's temporary training camp of
the same name and about five miles from the town of Sparta.
The surrounding area was relatively sparsely settled,
although the main line of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul,
and Pacific Railroad and a branch line of the Chicago and
8Northwestern Railway met at the training camp.
The prison camp consisted of four 480 foot by 190 foot 
compounds situated around a 216,562 square foot recreation­
al quadrangle. The Japanese were held in two compounds, 
and a group of five hundred Germans, who were brought to 
the camp December 20, 1943, and comprised the largest pro­
portion of the prisoners at the time, were held in the 
other two. Later, the Germans were moved into a newly 
built fifth compound and Korean prisoners were brought into 
the camp.
Running throughout the camp were graded, but unsur­
faced, roads. The camp also contained a ten bed hospital 
and sick call was held daily. A camp Medical officer and 
Dental officer were provided, although the medical services 
of the nearby post and two large wards of its hospital were 
available for any serious problems. The entire stockade 
was surrounded by a double cyclone wire fence with seven
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guard towers. The outer fence was topped with three 
strands of barbed wire and the inner twelve-foot fence 
with twelve strands. There was a twenty foot wide "skinned 
space" between the two and a military vehicle was driven 
through this space frequently during the day. Each tower 
was equipped with its own generator in case of emergency 
and was manned by a single guard, who was connected to the 
guard house by both a telephone and a two-way walkie 
talkie. The camp was first guarded by members of the 667th 
Military Police Escort Guard company, but they were later 
replaced by the 1620th Military Police unit.^
The enlisted prisoners were housed in former CCC 
barracks, built in 1935 and used from March 1942 until the 
arrival of the Japanese prisoners to hold civilian intern­
ees. Each barracks measured 130 foot by 20 foot and held 
up to fifty men. Every man was assigned a bunk bed, spaced 
in accordance with current Army regulations, as well as a 
small space for clothing and personal effects. This latter 
space was smaller than normal U.S. military standards due 
to the small size of the buildings. Wood burning stoves 
were used to heat the barracks. A special barracks was 
built for the Japanese officers, with several private rooms 
and a living room as well as showers, basins, and toilets. 
This barracks was also provided with furniture made by the 
prisoners.  ^^
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Each compound also contained a mess hall, which con­
tained separate dining halls for the officers and enlisted 
men and was similar in size to the barracks, and a day- 
room, made from an extra barracks and stocked with furni­
ture and games. The prisoners were also provided with 
bathhouses. Each was equipped with wash troughs, hot and 
cold running water, twelve laundry tubs, and a large wooden
tub constructed by the prisoners, as they preferred tub
12baths to showers.
McCoy remained the only prisoner of war camp for the 
Japanese until late January of 1945, when a flood of pris­
oners overwhelmed the capacity of the camp. At that time, 
military officials deactivated the German prisoner of war 
camp at Camp Clarinda, Iowa, and reconstituted it as a 
Japanese camp. German prisoners from the camp were care­
fully screened and 208 from the group of over 1600 were 
retained to do skilled maintenance work around the camp.
The others were transferred to Camp Algonia, another German 
13camp rn Iowa.
The camp at Clarinda was located about one mile south 
of Clarinda, Iowa, a small town of about 5000. It consist­
ed of three separate prisoner compounds and a recreational 
area, with a separate camp capable of accommodating thirty- 
two officers nearby. The camp itself covered about 116 
acres, although the entire reservation used around 285.^
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Each compound contained twenty 20 foot by 100 foot 
barracks, similar to the other military barracks of the 
time:, four 20 foot by 140 foot mess halls, four latrines, 
four orderly rooms, a canteen, an infirmary, and a T-shaped 
guardhouse. At first, while the number of prisoners re­
mained relatively small, officials kept all of the Japanese 
prisoners in Compound Number 3.-*-“’ Later, as their numbers 
increased, they were moved into other compounds as well.
The camps at McCoy and Clarinda remained the primary 
prisoner of war camps for the Japanese throughout the war. 
Except for a few medical facilities; processing and inter­
rogation centers; and "reeducation" camps, which were set
up in Texas near the end of the war, these camps held every
1 fJapanese prisoner in the United States.
Upon arrival at their permanent camp, the prisoners 
were to be "assigned to companies of approximately 250 
prisoners each," although at first there were not that many 
Japanese prisoners in the United States. Not much effort 
was made to establish disciplinary measures before August, 
1943, as the few prisoners interned in the U.S. caused 
very few discipline problems. However, as a large number 
of prisoners arrived during the summer months, the War- 
Department adopted a policy that made the prisoners "sub­
ject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the 
Army of the United States including the Articles of 
War . . . .  [and] the civil laws of the United States and
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of the state and municipality where interned.” They
were also subject to any rules that the commander deemed
necessary to maintain control of the camp, although these
rules had to comply with Army regulations and the Geneva
convention and were to be posted prominently around the
camp in the prisoners' native language. They were not,
however, required to obey any laws, regulations, or orders
of the country in whose military they were serving, except
1 8as they were also found in U.S. Army regulations.
At the same time, the commander could only admonish, 
reprimand, or withhold privileges from any prisoner, or 
restrict an officer, who failed to work or comply with 
regulations. These were mostly useless gestures, as the 
prisoners had few privileges and were not concerned with 
admonishments or reprimands from their enemy. For more 
serious offenses, the prisoners were subject to courts- 
martial, except as prescribed by law, international agree­
ment, or the War Department, and, except for officer pris­
oners, summary punishment by U.S. officers. If court- 
martialing a prisoner, however, the commander was required
to give three weeks notice to the protecting power, which
■ 19in the case of the Japanese prisoners was Spain.
Military personnel were to be firm and exact in en­
forcing military discipline. Prisoners were not to be 
subjected to cruel or unusual punishment or to be subjected 
to group punishment for the misconduct of an individual.
17
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Neither were they to be deprived of their rank. No prison­
er was allowed to discipline another prisoner and fraterni­
zation between American personnel and prisoners was not 
allowed.
The Army soon realized that the only effective disci­
plinary measures involved a prisoner's food and pay, so 
restrictions on diet and pay were instituted as punishment 
for prisoners. Section V of Army Regulation 600-375 al­
lowed commanders to restrict a prisoner's diet in addition 
to confining him in the guardhouse. The prisoner was to be 
provided with a minimum of eighteen ounces of bread a day 
and as much water as he desired. However, there were many 
limitations on this type of punishment. It could not be 
imposed continuously for more than fourteen days and was 
not to be repeated until a second fourteen days had passed. 
In addition, no prisoner was allowed to be put on the 
restricted diet for more than eighty-four days in a year 
and a doctor had to certify that his health could stand the 
diet. ^ ■*"
It also led to the policy of "administrative 
pressure." Under administrative pressure, a prisoner who 
refused to obey a lawful order or regulation could lose 
certain privileges or be placed on a restricted diet. This 
was not a form of punishment, but rather an inducement to 
the prisoner to obey a lawful order, as the prisoner could 
terminate the pressure at any time by obeying the order.
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The restricted diet or loss of privileges was not limited 
to a definite period of time, but could extend until the 
prisoner conformed to his captors' desires, as long as 
medical inspections warranted the continuation. Thus, if 
the prisoner's health required that he be removed from the 
restricted diet, he could be given a meal or a day's ra­
tions or more until his health was better and then placed 
back on the restricted diet.
Camp commanders could also withhold a prisoner's pay 
and allowances with "administrative pressure". Any money 
owed to the prisoner for work completed or for his monthly 
stipend could be withheld in the same way as rations. 
However, one dollar a month was to be given the prisoner,
even under administrative pressure, to allow him to pur-
• • • ?9chase certarn neccessxties.
The prisoners continued to wear the uniform they were 
captured in, unless circumstances or climate dictated 
otherwise, until it became unfit for use. At that time, 
they would be issued a new one by the processing station or 
prisoner of war camp. These were supplied from obsolete 
stock; any CCC stock, except for spruce green clothing; 
class "B" stock; and new stock, in that order. New stock 
would only be used in emergency cases, however. Some of 
the items available for issue included cotton trousers, a 
wool shirt and coat, underwear, socks, shoes, boots, a
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belt, gloves, a raincoat, and sanitary items. Shorts were 
not allowed unless the prisoner was engaging in sports or 
directed by American medical authorities to sunbathe.
Except for the prisoner's national uniform and the 
uniforms of the officer prisoners, all outer garments were 
marked in white paint with the letters "PW" or the 
prisoner's internment serial number. Black indelible ink 
was used for white or light colored clothing and orange 
paint for certain other clothing. Six inch stencils were 
used to mark the back of shirts, coats, blouses, and jack­
ets and four inch stencils were used on the backs of the 
prisoners sleeves, between the elbow and the shoulder, and 
on the pants, immediately above the knee on the front and 
immediately below the belt in the back. Officer prisoners 
were permitted to alter their uniforms in order to distin­
guish them from the enlisted prisoners, but other than 
that, the prisoners were not allowed to alter their uni­
forms in any way. Insignia, which designated the 
prisoner's rank, and decorations could be worn, however.
If caught altering their uniforms, the prisoners would have 
to return them to their original condition. If this could 
not be done, the uniform would be replaced and the prisoner 
charged for the replacement costs. This became an issue at 
McCoy, where the Japanese sometimes cut their shoes into 
thongs during the summer. Hair and grooming standards for
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the prisoners were the same as those of the U.S. 
mrlrtary.
In addition to their uniforms, the prisoners were also 
issued various sanitary articles, including razor blades, 
shaving brushes and creams, toothbrushes and toothpaste, 
combs, handkerchiefs, shoelaces, shoe polish, soap, towels, 
and needles and thread for sewing. Each prisoner could 
recieve up to one dollar's worth of these supplies each 
month, as needed.^
Food was provided for the prisoners by each camp. 
Although the nutritional value of the food issued to the 
prisoners was required by the Geneva convention to be of 
the same quality and quantity as that of the food given to 
U.S. troops, the food itself was not required to be of the 
same quality and quantity. In fact, on February 24, 1945 
the Provost Marshal General ordered that "immediate 
steps . . . be taken to ensure that rations furnished
Japanese prisoners of war do not exceed minimum require-
. ? Rmerits of the Geneva Convention." The prisoners still 
received wholesome food, but prime cuts of meat were re­
placed with poorer cuts and non-rationed foods replaced 
similar items that were rationed.
In September of 1943, the Office of the Provost Mar­
shal General prepared a "Japanese Menu" which listed pro­
posed menus to be provided the prisoners for every day of 
the month along with the lists of supplies required to
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prepare the menu listings. These menus were only prepared
as guides, however, since the Prisoner of War Circular No.
1, put out the very same month, allowed rations to be
altered "to suit the needs of the various national groups"
as long as the monetary value of the replacements did not
exceed that of the original rations and no food was
wasted. ° This satisfied the Japanese, whose drgestrve
systems were not used to American foods, and helped to
prevent waste. It also allowed the guards to ensure the
rations did not spoil. The average value of the rations
at Camp McCoy during February 1944 was 58.68 cents a day
per prisoner, but by March 1945 the prisoners were "being
fed principally rice, dried fish, and pickle." Later that
2 8year, however, the rations were increased again.
The prisoners were also encouraged to grow gardens. 
When the War Department determined that the cultivation 
increased the value of the land, the prisoners were even 
paid for this labor. The food grown in these gardens was 
used for the prisoners' food and the Quartermaster rations
were decreased accordingly. This ensured the prisoners
2 9fresh vegetables and helped lower costs for the Army.
The medical and dental treatment given the prisoners 
was also required to be identical with that of U.S. troops 
Upon arrival at their permanent camp, they were given a 
physical examination and "at Least once a month thereafter 
they [were] inspected by a medical officer for the purpose
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of detecting communicable diseases and vermin infesta
on . . .tion." Medical records were updated and immunizations 
and special lab tests or examinations were made as re­
quired.
To alleviate the domestic labor shortage caused by the 
war and to keep the prisoners busy, the U.S. employed its
O 1prisoners in several areas. The Geneva Convention 
allowed this as long as the labor did not directly relate 
to the war effort and did not jeopardize the health or 
safety of the prisoners. It also implied, however, that
O Othe work could not be degrading. Prisoners below the 
rank of sergeant could be used to perform general labor, 
while non-commissioned officers were to serve primarily as 
supervisors, and officers could not be made to work at 
all. However, this left several ideas on exactly which 
jobs the prisoners could perform.
Thus, in September, 1943, the War Department clarified 
its policies on prisoner employment. In order to comply 
with the requirement against work related to the war ef­
fort, prisoners were not to "handle or work on explosives, 
ammunition, aircraft, tanks, or other lethal weapons of 
war, nor could they handle any supplies destined for 
'combat units' ".34 However, combat units were very nsLr-
rowly defined as "units actually engaged or about to en-
• . • 15gage, m  operations against the enemy."
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Dangerous or unhealthful work was defined by "(l)the 
inherent nature of the job; (2)the particular conditions 
under which the job was to be performed; and (3)the indi- 
vidual capacity of the prisoner of war."JD Things such as 
the "proper safety devices, the training and experience of 
the PW, and the particular task involved, rather than the 
overall complexion of the industry, were also 
considered." American officers at the using levels were 
to make the final determination, although the prisoner 
could appeal to the Protecting Power or the Provost Marshal 
General.
Degrading work was at first defined simply as working 
as orderlies for other than their own officers, but was 
later defined more broadly to include work in civilian 
prisons, bartending for officer's clubs, entertaining U.S. 
military or civilian personnel, or working as pinboys at
7 obowling alleys.
In December, 1943, the War Department established a 
Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board to make the 
final decision on any doubtful employment practice. This 
group determined that maintenance, repair work, or parts 
salvage on any vehicles designed to hold people or cargo 
rather than combat weapons, "scraping operations" on any 
military vehicle, or work on gas masks or connected with 
the shipment of hydrogen-filled cylinders was permissable, 
but preparing vehicles for overseas shipments, steam clean­
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ing tanks, or work connected with guns, rifle ranges,
bayonet courses, or any other aids used to train personnel
• 3 9in combat weapons was not.
POW labor was divided into several classes and sub­
groups. All work connected with the administration, man­
agement and maintenance of prisoner of war camps was Class 
1 and all other types of work were Class 2. Class 1 labor 
was primarily for the benefit of the prisoners and included 
maintenance and repair of the POW compounds, labor incident 
to the comfort or health of the prisoners, and work con­
nected "with the interior economy of their companies."^0 
Essential labor connected with U.S. military installations 
was further labeled Priority I, labor contracted out to 
civilian employers was labeled Priority II, and non-essen­
tial work on military reservations was labeled Priority 
III.41
The War Department did not allow the Japanese prison­
ers to perform Priority II labor for much of the war be­
cause of anti-Japanese sentiment among the civilian popu­
lace. In April 1943, three Japanese-American farm boys 
were released from a civilian internment camp on the west 
coast by the War Relocation Board to help the residents of 
Marengo, Illinois, who were struggling with labor short­
ages. The boys "were marched back to the train station by 
an angry mob led by the mayor, the president of the Park 
Board, and the commander of the local post of the American
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L e g i o n . T h i s  happened even though the boys were Ameri­
can citizens, so after hearing about it, the War Department 
refused to put any Japanese prisoners in a similar situa­
tion, or worse, and only allowed them to work for the CJ.S. 
government itself.
The prisoners at McCoy and Clarinda repaired and 
maintained automotive equipment, handled freight in ware­
houses, cleared forests and underbrush, cut wood, dug 
ditches, repaired roads, cooked, worked in the laundry, 
accomplished demolition and construction work, and even 
worked on gas masks.^ The prisoners worked best when 
commanded by their own supervisors, when working in a 
group, and when given a ten minute rest period in the 
middle of the morning and afternoon. "As a whole, the 
Japanese were anxious to make a good impression, but became 
sullen when urged on or hurried in their work.
When working outside of the camp, the prisoners worked 
in groups of up to one hundred and four. They were guarded 
by two MP's and two dog handlers. Every three weeks, the 
dog handlers put on a demonstration for the prisoners, 
which served as both entertainment and a helpful reminder 
of the dogs' abilities. The dogs were therefore well 
respected by the prisoners and this allowed the use of so 
few guards. If the worksite was nearby, the Japanese NCO's 
would march the other prisoners to the site, but if the 
distance was longer, the military would truck them. In
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this manner, the prisoners tore down the CCC camp at Tomah,
Wisconsin, a nearby town, in order to build a hospital in
its place.^ For lunch, the prisoners on these work de-
Atails would bring a sandwich or donut from breakfast.
While the prisoners were required to work, many were 
compensated for their labor. Pay was given in canteen 
coupons so that there would be no opportunity to bribe 
guards or use money in an escape attempt. Each enlisted 
prisoner was given ten cents a day, which the War Depart­
ment averaged out to three dollars a month for expediency, 
but laborers were rewarded with up to eighty cents a day 
more, based on the amount of work accomplished. This 
amount may seem paltry by today's standards, but was based 
loosely upon the twenty-one dollars a month (70 cents a 
day) salary paid to American privates in 1941 and would buy 
the prisoner eight packs of cigarettes or eight bottles of 
beer. In fact, prisoners at McCoy averaged nineteen dol­
lars for the month of February, 1944, which is very close 
to that amount. Even when Germany admitted it could not 
pay the same amount and Italy and Japan failed to respond 
to the U.S. proposal to do so, the United States continued 
to pay its prisoners in this manner. In case of escape, 
however, the prisoner lost his allowance for any time that 
he was not in U.S. custody. ^
The Army quickly realized a major deficiency in its 
plan. Not all prisoner labor was as efficient as free
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labor. To alleviate this situation and to provide an 
incentive for prisoners to work harder, the War Department 
developed a system of incentive pay. This system was used 
with piecework "to reward hard workers; to penalize lag­
gards; and to encourage a greater degree of teamwork among 
prisoner laborers."^® U.S. supervisors determined how much 
work the average free worker would be able to complete in a 
normal day. The prisoners were then paid, up to $1.20 a 
day, for the percentage of work they accomplished. If a 
worker could complete 10 units of work a day, then the 
prisoner was paid eight cents a unit. This meant that he 
would be paid 96 cents if he completed twelve units, but 
only 64 cents if he completed only eight. To encourage 
teamwork, the workers were divided into small groups of 
twenty-five or less and each group member was paid an equal 
share of the total earnings of the group.
Another system used to achieve greater production was 
the task system. Each prisoner or group of prisoners 
working under this system would be assigned a definite 
amount of work to be completed. They were informed of the 
amount of work to be completed and any action that would be 
taken for fast or slow work. Prisoners would continue to 
work until the assigned amount was completed. This meant 
that slow workers would spend more of their day working 
while fast workers would go home earlier. Normally, disci­
plinary action was also taken for habitually slow workers.
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A "reasonable" amount of work was usually given, but by the 
end of the war, the prisoners were required to work at 
least nine hour days to complete their tasks, even if they 
were working quickly. ^
Not all prisoners were paid for their labor, though. 
The War Department planned for Class 1 labor, work per­
formed for the benefit of the prisoners, whether inside or 
outside the camp, to be unpaid labor. However, in prac­
tice, this work was divided into paid and unpaid labor.
The War Department realized that the prisoners' morale 
would drop, and with it their efficiency, if they were not 
allowed an equal opportunity to work for pay, so "it ruled 
that neccessary work within the camp which excluded the 
PW's from other renumerative labor would be classified as 
paid labor.
By January 1944, any labor associated with the 
management of POW camps that required special training or 
experience, employed prisoners full-time, and was restrict­
ed to a certain number of workers was classified as paid 
labor. It included cooks, interpreters, company leaders, 
clerks, typists, bookkeepers, stenographers, accountants, 
warehouse supply clerks, warehousemen, carpenters, plumbers 
electricians, and mechanics.
Certain housekeeping jobs, however, "which represented 
only irregular or occasional work were cited as typical 
unpaid labor. Clerks, cook's helpers, tailors, cobblers,
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and barbers were among those l i s t e d . O t h e r  jobs, which 
needed to be done, but were not paid labor, including the 
policing of the camp and maintaining and repairing the 
barracks, walks, sewers, and fences of the camp, were 
accomplished by daily fatigue details. These details were 
assigned to the prisoners by the camp commander and paid 
the standard eighty cents in canteen coupons, which were 
contributed by prisoners assigned to paid work. In this
way, an equitable distribution of paid labor was main-
. R 9tamed.
If a prisoner performing paid labor sustained an 
injury on the job which prevented him from working for pay 
and the injury was not caused by willful misconduct, the 
intention to harm or kill himself or another, or by volun­
tary intoxication, he would normally be paid forty cents a 
day, following the first three days of the injury and not 
including Sundays, until he was again able to work, repa-
,  ,  C  Otrrated, or died.
The attending medical officer would determine the 
ability of prisoners to work and classified them in one of 
three catagories: heavy work, light work, or sick - no 
work. A list of the prisoners showing their individual 
labor status was posted on each prisoner company headquar­
ters from time to time.^
Some prisoners also worked as unpaid volunteers. They 
engaged in teaching part-time, entertaining, jobs "connect­
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ed with recreational or welfare projects," building furni­
ture for their recreation rooms, building or decorating 
chapels, tending athletic fields, or planting flower gar- 
dens around the camps.
By 1944, non-commissioned officers were allowed to 
volunteer for work they would not normally do. While they 
normally worked as supervisors, some NCO's volunteered for 
non-supervisory duties in areas in which they had special 
skills or aptitudes. At first, these duties were to last 
only between thirty and ninety days, but by 1945, they were
allowed to volunteer for any job for the duration of their
■ • 5ficaptivity.
Officers, who could not be forced to work, volunteered 
for paid labor as well. They worked as spokesmen, leaders, 
and at other sub-administrative work and were paid the same 
eighty cents a day as the enlisted prisoners, although they 
received special pay as officers as well (see appendix 2 ). 
If there were no commissioned officers in the camp, the 
prisoners elected a spokesman, who was approved by the camp 
commander. In camps with officers, however, the senior 
officer prisoner in the highest grade served in this posi­
tion, unless he was mentally or physically incapacitated or
incompetent. Some officers accepted the positions, but
• • S 7refused the additional pay.
In addition to their own rooms, special pay, and the 
opportunity to choose not to work, officers were given
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another privilege by the Geneva Convention - orderlies. 
These prisoners performed the duties of normal orderlies 
and were often paid by the officers for whom they worked. 
One was assigned to each general, one to every six field 
grade officers, and one to every twelve company grade 
officers. Only prisoners who could not perform a full
C Oday's work were assigned to the job. ° There were nega­
tives to an officer's life as well, however. Officer 
prisoners were required to pay for their meals, which
averaged around seventeen dollars a month, and for their
. R 9clothing.
With the money they received for their labor, the 
prisoners were able to purchase tobacco, cheap candies, 
toiletries, food, and other supplies from the camp canteen. 
At McCoy, the canteen was near the entrance to the gate and 
was shared by all nationalities. It was run by prisoners, 
who worked on a contract basis and were paid by profits, 
and supervised by an American officer who was appointed to 
the job by the camp commander. Anything that the prisoners 
wanted, as long as it was approved by the camp commander, 
could be obtained from the canteen. This included beer and 
light wines with no more than a 3.2% alcohol content. 
However, no prisoner was allowed to buy more than one quart 
in a twenty-four hour period or possess more than a certain 
amount at one time. The profits made by the canteen were
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placed into a special POW fund and used for the benefit of 
all of the prisoners at the camp.^
Prisoners were given a twenty four hour rest period 
once a week, normally on Sundays. They were also free 
during the evenings after all of their work was accom­
plished. During this free time, prisoners were allowed 
to engage in various recreational activities. At both 
McCoy and Clarinda, prisoners soon formed theatrical 
troupes and orchestras. Inspection reports describe 
various plays written and performed by the prisoners, with 
background music provided by their orchestra and elaborate
sets and costumes created by artists within the camp and
ft 9monthly concerts performed by the orchestras. Prisoners 
learned to ice skate, played baseball, ping-pong, tennis, 
and card games, listened to records, and watched weekly 
movies provided for them by the camp authorities. They 
cared for rare tropical birds provided by the camp command- 
er and spent time reading books from the camp libraries, 
which grew to well over six hundred volumes in Japanese in 
addition to the English books/ ’4 They also used this time 
to make toys and paper flowers out of cigarette paper and 
rice water, build furniture for their barracks and recrea­
tion rooms, paint, write poetry, and develop spiritually. 
They were allowed visitors twice a month, but it is not
known whether the Japanese took advantage of this opportu- 
65nity.
Only a few chose to become Christians during their 
captivity, but many were involved in Buddhist and Shinto 
services and participated in individual daily spiritual 
rituals each morning. They "fixed up a Japanese 
chapel . . . [with] a sanctuary and an alter with carved
idols and artificial flowers made by the prisoners.
Schools were also set up at the camps. Although well- 
developed programs took a while to develop, adhoc classes 
in English and several other subjects started quickly. By 
January 1944, Japanese prisoners at McCoy had classes in 
English and Japanese writing, and lectures on general 
culture, ethics, and history. Thirteen months later, a
full time school had been established. In it, thirty-two 
high school students learned English, Japanese, geography, 
arithmetic, moral science, Japanese history, ancient Japa­
nese literature, and water color painting. Forty percent 
of the older prisoners were also receiving instruction in 
these and other subjects, including American history, 
religion, and physical training. All of the instructors at 
the camp had been professional teachers in civilian life
ZT Oand were paid for their duties from the PW fund. Mili­
tary regulations also allowed prisoners to receive degrees 
from several prestigious universities and colleges, al­
though no records state that the Japanese took advantage of
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Once they had been assigned to a permanent camp, 
prisoners left in only one of three ways: transfer, death, 
or repatriation. With only the two main Japanese camps, 
the Army transferred its Japanese prisoners very infre­
quently. Camp McCoy transferred almost all of its officers 
and non-commissioned officers after a riot occurred, but 
all other transfers were accomplished on a case by case 
basis and usually involved prisoners who needed to be 
reinterrogated or assigned to a special "reeducation" 
project (see Chapter 5).
Death was not a major factor of prison camp life, 
either. "Of the 5,424 prisoners in the United States, only 
twenty-four died while in captivity. Two apparently killed 
themselves [one accidental], three were shot during an 
escape attempt [which could probably be better described as 
a suicide attempt, since the prisoners had attempted sui­
cide before]. . ., one died in an agricultural accident,
and the remaining eighteen succombed to earlier wounds or 
natural causes."^ However, the Army had quickly developed 
a policy for even this.
Upon the death of a prisoner, the camp commander or 
officer charged with the prisoner's custody prior to death 
would be immediately notified. He would then report the 
death to the Provost Marshal General, giving the prisoner's 
full name, internment serial number, place and cause of 
death, and note if the prisoner's death resulted from his
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own misconduct. If the death was the result of an escape 
attempt, foul play or suspected foul play, violence, or 
other unnatural cause, including suicide, or if the cause 
was unknown, a summary court was appointed to investigate 
and was to report its findings directly to the Provost 
Marshal General.
The dead prisoner was given a funeral with full mili­
tary honors. The flag of the country in whose army the 
prisoner had served would be draped over the casket. Also, 
if requested by the other prisoners, taps would be played 
and a salute fired by base personnel. Although military 
regulations allowed a burial in the nearest available
permanent cemetery, most Japanese prisoners were 
7 1cremated.
This left the majority of: the prisoners in their 
permanent camp until the war's end. Finally, on 7 Septem­
ber, 1945, officials at Camp McCoy and Camp Clarinda were 
ordered to transfer all Japanese prisoners of Okinawan 
origin to Angel Island. A month later, on October 5, they 
were to have transferred all of their other Japanese pris­
oners to the west coast for repatriation as well. This 
included 987 Japanese prisoners from Camp Clarinda and 
2,550 Japanese, 144 Koreans, and 3 Formosans from McCoy. 
Thus, within one month of the end of the war the prisoners 
began to be repatriated. They were first sent to clusters 
of holding camps near San Francisco and Los Angeles. Here
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they waited for ships to continue their journey. For a 
while, life remained much the same as it had been in the 
permanent camps. However, as ships began to arrive, each 
prisoner "was fingerprinted once again, his records updat­
ed, and his belongings searched for 'contraband' or money 
in excess of the 500 yen ($125) or 200 yen ($50) which the
officers or enlisted men respectively were allowed to bring
• • 7 7back to Japan" in preparation for his journey home.
On November 13, 1945, 672 Japanese prisoners were 
transferred to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation from 
Angel Island and the camp commander requested the camp be 
closed. By the end of December, 1,120 prisoners, including 
675 who were sick or badly wounded, had been shipped back 
to Japan from the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, not 
including the numbers shipped from the other ports. Of the 
5,413 Japanese prisoners who had been held in the United 
States in August, only 2,086 remained. By the end of 
January, only one prisoner remained. This prisoner was no 
longer held as a prisoner of war, however, but had joined 
141 Germans and twenty Italians who had been incarcerated 
in U.S. prisons. He was held in the penitentiary at McNeil
Island, Washington. The Japanese prisoners of war had been 
73freed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF INDOCTRINATION
Although the United States provided for all of the 
physical needs of their prisoners, the Japanese training 
toward and shame of capture continued to have a dramatic 
impact on the prisoners, even after they had reached Ameri 
can soil. Many prisoners, when captured, requested that 
they be allowed to commit suicide. When the request was 
invariably denied, the prisoners continued their quest by 
other means. Several incidents took place, the most dra­
matic of which was at the prisoner of war camp in New 
Caledonia, where twenty-three prisoners committed suicide 
and two others attempted it in February of 1944. However 
by the time the prisoners reached the United States, sui­
cide had almost always ceased to be an option. While some 
attempts were still made, very few were successful.
Kazuo Sakamaki lamented in I Attacked Pearl Harbor
that
we were simple-minded fighting men . . . .  We 
had been so trained that our thinking was all 
concentrated on the most effective means of 
expending our lives for a victory in war. Then 
we failed in the one thing we had lived 
for . . . .
How could we face our people again?
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Death by suicide was the only logical 
solution to our predicament . . . .
Our desire for suicide, however, was 
thwarted on every hand. We had no knives to 
cut our throats. We had no ropes to hang 
ourselves with. Some of us banged our heads 
against every object in sight, and yet we did 
not die. Some refused to eat. But the idea of 
dying slowly was even more trying than living 
hungrily.^
However, the prisoners soon began conforming, at least 
outwardly, to their captors' standards for prisoners. 
Sakamaki notes later in the text that the old-timers ex­
tended the new prisoners a warm welcome and helped to 
acclimatize them to their new surroundings. In fact, 
Sakamaki himself gave a speech to each incoming group of 
prisoners, explaining that although he understood how they 
felt, they must
respect the regulations we have set up . . .  .
[and] abide by the laws and regulations per­
taining to the prisoner of war. I know how 
trying it will be for you to be a prisoner, but 
for your own sake I advise you to restrain 
yourself no matter how hard you find it . . .  .
I know that since your capture you have 
attempted more than once, at least in your 
mind, to take your life into your own hands.
But you are now a prisoner, not a combatant, 
and your life is governed not by the lawless­
ness of war but by an international agreement.
If you have come with any idea of yourself 
still being a soldier, abandon that idea at 
once. You are not a combatant any more . . . .
No matter how much you may mourn over the 
uniform of a prisoner of war you are wearing, 
you cannot change the uniform . . . .  We are 
prisoners of war. We cannot be anything else 
right now. If you will adjust your thinking to 
the status of a prisoner of war, you will not 
have to struggle so much. Your names are known 
to the Japanese government through the Swiss
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government. That you are prisoners of war is 
now public information. Death or any other 
escape method will not alter the fact that you 
were once a prisoner . . .
Suppose you have decided to hang yourself, 
or fight the guard and be killed, or steal a 
knife from the kitchen and cut your throat.
What will the world think of you . . . .  They 
will not think you brave or praise you for 
committing suicide. They will write about it 
in papers and laugh about it . . .  .
If you had wanted to die, you should have 
died before coming here. You missed your last 
chance to commit suicide. You and I are now 
prisoners recognized as such by governments.
There is no more honor or freedom for suicide.
A suicide in the camp will only cause trouble 
for others.
The Japanese prisoners still felt they had betrayed 
the emperor, their homeland, and their families. Their 
friends had given their lives while they lived. Their 
friends had died in the finest tradition of the fighting 
man and they were living in the most contemptuous state—  
as prisoners of the enemy. Because of this, they felt they 
would be hated and despised, even by their closest family, 
when they returned home after the war. Desperate for 
acceptance, they developed new and close social ties with 
each other "which tended to overshadow all former social 
ties and, in keeping with Japanese cultural conditioning, 
involved rights and obligations which apparently were 
rigorously adhered to."^
They also developed hobbies to keep their minds occu­
pied. Some engaged in the vigorous sports programs provid­
ed by the camp. Others studied or read. One prisoner,
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Lt. Commander Matsumoto, even made paper dolls. Those who 
could not find an outlet or some way to keep their minds 
off of their condition soon went crazy. Commander Naka- 
mune, one of the first senior officers captured, was the 
first to do so.
Commander Nakamune was the Chief Engineer on the 
aircraft carrier Hiryu. He was captured at Midway, after 
the ship went down and he and a few other survivors had 
drifted in a lifeboat for fifteen days. He continually 
attempted suicide, but never succeeded. He began imagining 
that the U.S. government was transmitting waves of electric 
ether at the prisoners and so spent much time in the bath, 
which he thought protected him. If caught out of the bath, 
he would wrap a wet towel full of broken glass around his 
head. This, he felt, would prevent the electricity from 
penetrating to him. One day, after "jumping around in the 
camp ground shouting madly", he was permanently assigned to
the infirmary. Although he was the first, he was not the
• • • 6 only prisoner to lose his sanity.
With few exceptions, however, the Japanese prisoners 
quickly became very cooperative and discharged all assigned 
duties with few complaints, at least until the middle of 
1944. However, as greater numbers of prisoners began 
arriving from the battles in the Pacific, the prisoners 
became more apathetic and uncooperative. This culminated 
in a battle of wills at Camp McCoy on May 30, 1944.
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When vast numbers of new prisoners were brought into 
the camps, telling of long strings of Japanese reverses, 
this exacerbated the older prisoners' fragile psychological 
conditions, since they had assumed that American newspaper 
articles on the war were only propaganda. Many could not 
conceive of a Japanese defeat. Others questioned how their 
treatment would change when Japan was no longer a threat 
and wondered what would happen to them after the war was 
over. In addition, rivalries began to develop between the 
old prisoners and the new, which compounded the already 
severe problems between Army and Navy prisoners. These 
conflicts made the prisoners even more anxious to do any­
thing which would remove or lessen the stigma of being 
taken prisoner and prove them a "good" Japanese soldier.
The requirement in the Geneva Convention that forced 
them to labor for their captors provided just such an 
opportunity. The Japanese had never fully understood the 
Convention. Their country had not been one of the signato­
ries and, although it later agreed to abide by its regula­
tions, Japan had never taught its soldiers anything about 
it, knowing that any such training would negate their 
training against surrender. Thus, when their captors told 
the prisoners they were required to work for them, the 
prisoners understandably felt they would be further betray­
ing their country by doing so. For this reason, and for 
those cited above, on May 30, 1944, many prisoners at Camp
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McCoy refused to accomplish assigned tasks and others, 
even those who otherwise would have completed their duties, 
were pressured into non-compliance as well.
According to a War Department report on the matter, 
"the Japanese had always disliked working on such jobs as 
ditch digging, road repairing and similar maintenance jobs 
within the military reservation, adopting the attitude that 
such labor was of assistance to [the U.S.'s] war effort." 
However, they had always accomplished the duties, albeit 
with growing discontent, until May 30, at approximately 
2 : 0 0 p.m., when the prisoners on a work detail refused to 
move a tent frame as ordered by 1st Sgt. Boisvert Lambert, 
the supervisor of their detail. The senior Japanese offi­
cer and former spokesman, Lt. Commander Matsumoto, who was 
viewed as a steadying influence on the prisoners, was in 
the hospital with a heart condition, so Lt. Kajashima, the 
new spokesman, was sent for. He was told to make his men 
accomplish their task, but he refused to do so. Lt. Col. 
Rogers, the camp commander, then ordered Lt. Kajashima and 
Ensign Sakamaki, who understood English, into the orderly 
room, but they pretended not to understand the orders. He 
then asked the American interpreter, Sgt. Tamura, to get 
the prisoners to work, but the officers would not pass 
along the orders and the enlisted prisoners refused to work 
without direct orders from their officers.
109
Lt. Col. Rogers spent several hours trying to convince 
the Japanese officers to change their minds and countermand 
their orders, but they continually refused. Finally, 
seeing that the situation was out of control, he had the 
officers moved into the prison ward of the post hospital, 
which was about five miles from the POW camp and was the 
only available space away from the other prisoners, without 
allowing them any opportunity to give further orders to 
their men.
He then called on the senior non-commissioned officer 
prisoners and asked for their cooperation. When the first 
nine, out of a group of about ninety, refused to disobey 
their officers and cooperate with the Americans, Lt. Col. 
Rogers placed them in solitary confinement and restricted 
their diets to bread and water.
At approximately the same time, 5:00 p.m., all of the 
Japanese prisoners refused to eat the evening meal, which 
was in the process of being prepared, to clean the mess 
halls, or to police up or save the unused food. Enlisted 
men in the POW camp's hospital refused to take their medi­
cine, for malaria, until forced to do so by the hospital 
staff. This was the beginning of what Lt. Col. Rogers
8called a "G[h]andi sit down strike of passive resistance."
Bed check was normal that night, so Lt. Col. Rogers 
and the post executive officer went to the hospital to see
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if Lt. Commander Matsumoto would issue the necessary or­
ders. He either would not or could not act.
The next morning, May 31, no cooks or K.P.'s showed up 
at 6:30 a.m. No food was prepared and no prisoners showed 
up for mess. At 7:50 a.m., roll call was attempted, but no 
prisoners reported for their work details. Instead, they 
chose to sit or stand in the barracks or company area.
After issuing a clear warning to the NCO's, Lt. Col. Rogers 
asked the post commander for reinforcements. At 0815, the 
1620th Military Police Group arrived. Lt. Col. Rogers 
explained to the unit that they were there to assert U.S. 
authority and had them affix bayonets to their weapons.
The unit and the camp guards then marched all of the pris­
oners except the officers and the nine NCO's in solitary 
confinement, at the doubletime, one hundred and forty paces 
a minute, the entire five mile journey down Highway 21 to 
the prisoners' worksite. The prisoners were forced to work 
all morning then marched back to the camp for lunch in the 
same manner. Since many of the new prisoners had not yet 
regained their strength from living in poor battlefield 
conditions, several of them were not able to keep up with 
the strenuous pace. The guards hurried these stragglers 
with jabs to the buttocks from their bayonets. This con­
tinued until the prisoner either kept up the required pace 
or dropped from exhaustion or pain. About twelve of the 
prisoners received bayonet wounds and a few who could go no
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further were picked up by a truck driven behind the group 
for just such a contingency. While one of the guards 
described the march as a "bloody mess," he also noted that 
it accomplished its purpose.
At 12:01 p.m., the senior NCO for the prisoners in­
formed Lt. Col. Rogers that the prisoners had had enough 
and would now follow the orders of the American authori­
ties. Cooks and K.P.'s were assigned to the mess halls and 
lunch was prepared and eaten. Emergency details were 
organized and sent to work at 2:00 p.m. At 3:00 p.m., the 
NCO's in solitary confinement were called in to see Lt.
Col. Rogers and all agreed to obey the American authori­
ties, according to the Geneva Convention, since the offi­
cers were no longer in the camp.
New spokesmen and company leaders were appointed and 
the prisoners' chain of command was completely reorganized. 
All prisoners, except the casualties from the march and 
those medically excused, worked the rest of the day. The 
next day, the prisoners returned to work as scheduled. The 
German prisoners, who quickly heard of the ordeal, were 
affected by the incident as well. They quickly informed 
their guards that no such action would be required for 
them.
Soon after the incident, the prisoners requested a 
visit from the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C., their 
representatives to the Geneva Convention. Senor Gonzales,
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the Spanish consul at Chicago, was sent to investigate. 
Escorted by a member of the War Department, he completed a 
cursory investigation of the camp and interviewed Lt. Col. 
Rogers and the prisoners. By the time of his visit, all 
but about ten of the NCO's had refused to cooperate with 
the Americans in any way. Work was still being accom­
plished by the prisoners, however, who were supervised by 
the cooperative NCO's. The non-cooperating NCO's said they 
had no complaint with the handling of the incident, but 
wanted to be housed with their officers, who were still in 
the hospital at this time. The officers, when contacted, 
said they had no argument with this, but complained that 
they were being punished illegally by being confined to the 
hospital. Lt. Col. Rogers informed the investigators that 
he was awaiting orders to allow the NCO's and officers to 
be housed together and that the officers were not being 
held at the hospital as punishment, but that the hospital 
was the only place to house them until space became avail­
able at the camp. He also noted that a separate camp was 
being built for the Germans to help accommodate the large 
influx of prisoners to the U.S. and that this would help 
solve the problem. Senor Gonzales said he felt no inappro­
priate actions had been taken and that the camp was being 
run properly, so he would send a 'good report' to the
QEmbassy.
113
A second incident occurred on a Sunday night, October 
29, 1944, at Fitzsimmons General Hospital, Colorado. Three 
prisoners, Chief Gunner's Mate Kuzuhori Mankino, Warrant 
Officer Saburo Nakagawa, and Private First Class Sadamu 
Okada, were being treated for tuberculosis. Only two 
months before, the three had attempted hari-kiri with 
kitchen utensils from the hospital . One of them had 
completely opened his stomach, another had attempted the 
same feat, and the third had inflicted a cut on his head, 
but all three must have been recuperating well; they had 
just received orders to be returned to McCoy. Although 
they were unaccustomed to drinking milk and had never 
ordered it before, that night they ordered milk. A hospi­
tal orderly passed a bottle of milk through the door to 
them "and they immediately threw the milk at the orderly, 
and broke the glass all over the floor with the milk spill­
ing around."-*-0 A nearby guard, armed with a billy club, 
came to the assistance of the orderly. They opened the 
door and "insisted that the prisoners clean up the broken 
glass and milk. The prisoners became belligerent and 
attacked the guard who used his club upon them."0-^- The 
prisoners responded by attacking the guard with the handles 
of the brooms and mops they had been using to clean the 
room. The guard broke his billy club on one of the prison­
ers who then retrieved the broken end and hit the guard 
over the head with it. Another guard, this one armed with
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a carbine, had arrived from the guard office by this 
time. He aimed his weapon at the floor and fired, trying 
to calm the situation. However, the first guard, by some 
means, was able to gain control of the rifle. After re­
portedly warning the prisoners with no response, he shot
three times. Each shot hit its mark, as one prisoner was
• 12shot through the head and the other two in the heart.
A third incident, another strike, occurred at Camp 
Clarinda on February 21, 1945. The strike started at 
1 0 : 0 0 a.m., when a work detail refused to continue work 
because of weather conditions, a severe snowstorm having 
just occurred in the vicinity. Other work details followed 
suit. The strike was finally broken by the removal of all 
food from the compound. A Field Service Report on the 
event noted that the camp commander there had adopted a 
policy of extreme firmness, since most of the prisoners had
1 Orefused to work.
Several escapes occurred as well. While some of the 
prisoners may have escaped briefly from work details with­
out a record being kept, the only reported escapes by 
Japanese prisoners came from McCoy and occurred between 
July 3, 1944 and August 29, 1945. The majority took place 
in the last three months of the war.
Terumasa Kibata was the first reported Japanese pris­
oner to escape. At approximately 11:30 a.m. on July 3, 
1944, while working on a new road, approximately eleven
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miles northeast of the camp, he slipped into the forest.
He "intended 'to catch a train and get away from the 
camp'. The local radio and press was advised of the 
escape and a state-wide police bulletin was issued. In 
addition, an extensive search of the camp and surrounding 
areas was conducted by FBI agents, local military person­
nel, and surrounding police agencies. Air surveillance was 
provided by two army planes. However, Kibata had no idea 
of where he was heading or how to prolong his escape so 
"after wandering in the woods, [he] decided to 
surrender . . . He reported to the Camp McCoy orderly
room the day after his escape and was quickly turned over 
to the authorities at the nearby POW camp. The authorities 
blamed Kibata's escape on shell-shock.
The next escape involved three prisoners and was 
better planned and organized. Takeo Nakamura arrived at 
Camp McCoy in August of 1944 and began formulating a plan 
of escape in September. "He recalled from his study of 
geography in school that the Mississippi River ran into the 
Gulf of Mexico and when he was brought from the West Coast 
to the camp he recalled crossing the river and observing 
the 'mountains running alongside the river near LaCrosse, 
Wisconsin.'"XD
While Nakamura claimed to have no hope of reaching the 
Gulf of Mexico or leaving the country, he explained that he 
had violated a sacred obligation to his people and would
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probably be shot if returned to Japan. He assumed he would 
be shot when apprehended and believed this to be more 
honorable than continuing to be held prisoner.
In January, he stole a road map of Wisconsin and a 
topographical map of the camp. In February, he met Hajine 
Hashimoto and Kohei Tanaka when they were moved into the 
same compound. The three became friends and he enlisted 
them as accomplices in his plan. He explained part of his 
plan to his new friends, in case they were separated after 
the escape, but kept many of the details to himself. 
Throughout the rest of the spring, the three gathered 
materials they would need for the escape. Once everything 
was prepared, they waited for warmer weather and for a 
stormy night, which would cover their escape.
At 8:00 p.m. on May 21, they decided to leave after 
lights out. A short time after 10:00 p.m., Nakamura, who 
had pretended to fall asleep with his clothes on, cut 
through the camp's fences with a pair of stolen bolt-cut­
ters and prepared to wait for his friends, who were hiding 
nearby. However, as he slipped through the fence, the camp 
dogs started barking and he became scared. He left without 
his friends after a short time. He followed the railroad 
tracks to the Mississippi River, which took five days, and 
then stole a rowboat and headed downstream. At approxi­
mately 8:00 a.m. on May 28, five and one half days after 
his escape, he was taken into custody by a commercial
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fisherman, who took him to the local sheriff's office.
From there, he was transferred to the custody of the FBI 
and then to camp authorities.
Hashimoto and Tanaka also started towards the Missis­
sippi River when they realized that Nakamura had left 
without them. However, since hashimoto's ankle had been 
injured in battle, the rough terrain and miserable weather 
forced them to leave the "mountain" area for the "flat 
ground." They began traveling on a country road and were 
captured less than an hour later, at 4:00 p.m. on June 1, 
by the LaCrosse County Police. The two prisoners reported 
that they wanted to reach San Francisco, where they entered 
the U.S.
The other escapes took place soon after. Kazuyuki
Maeda left a work project "to aid the U.S. Army without the
17other Japanese in the camp knowing about it." He left 
between 1:30 and 4:30 p.m. on June 15 and was located 
sometime after 5:30 p.m. the same day in a hospital area of 
the camp.
Mitsuhei Hirosawa escaped during the night of July 3. 
He "was recaptured without resistance July 8 , 1945, on a 
farm, where he had stopped to ask for food, by a County 
Traffic Officer." He claimed to have "had no specific 
reason for escaping. He stated that he was lonely and 
despondent at the camp because he had no friends and be­
cause he found it most difficult to make friends. He had
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no intention of going anywhere. He merely wanted to get
1 Qaway from camp and be alone."
The next prisoners escaped not to get away from the 
camp, but rather to get away from the other prisoners, who 
they felt would beat them up. Masao Kitamura crawled under 
the fence July 4. The escape was discovered the next 
morning at the 6:30 a.m. roll call, but Kitamura was cap­
tured in the gondola of a freight train only on July 17.
He escaped "because he had lost face with his fellow pris­
oners . "20
Mitsuo Yamamoto escaped from a grass cutting detail at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day that Kitamura was 
recaptured. Almost exactly two days later, he was "seen 
crossing a road on his hands and knees . . .  on the South
• O 1Range of the military reservation." He escaped because 
he thought the other prisoners would beat him up for an 
action he had taken of which they disapproved.
Toshio Yano escaped from a work detail on July 28 
because he felt the other prisoners suspected he was an 
informant. He was captured the next day, still on the 
reservation.
The next prisoners to escape were Nobumori Kikuchi and 
Hideo Matsuzaki. They were tired of living in the camp and 
walked away from a work detail August 9. They were recap­
tured two days later walking down the railroad tracks 
leading from the camp.
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Yuzo Ohashi was the last Japanese prisoner to escape. 
He walked away from a work detail at 9:00 a.m., August 29. 
He "walked south for several days . . . towards Mexico,
which he believed to be located about 300 miles south of 
camp McCoy." He escaped because he believed the war was 
over and did not want to be returned to Japan, where he had
9 olost face.
Another response to Japanese training relating to the 
shame of capture was voluntary cooperation with the United 
States. There are many recorded instances of prisoners 
going back into their own lines to convince others to 
surrender.^ Other prisoners chose to help the U.S. in 
other ways as well, some even volunteering to fight against 
Japan. However, the most extreme example of this behav­
ior involved the politically liberal-radical prisoners who 
helped the United States begin their reeducation program 
for the Japanese prisoners.
Records show that the Navy had begun recognizing signs 
of discontent with Japan among its prisoners as early as 
September of 1 9 4 4 . ^ 6 By February, 1945, they had trans­
ferred a prisoner from Australia to learn about the under­
current of discontent in Japan and, if possible, the under­
ground movement there. However, serious consideration for 
the reeducation program came from two events occurring soon
thereafter.
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Andrew Roth, a Naval Reserve Lieutenant, advised the 
U.S. Navy to sponsor a "Free Japan" movement among the 
prisoners. This movement would provide a U.S. alternative 
to the militarists in power and to left-wing, communistic 
opposition groups by training future Japanese Democratic 
leaders. He argued the need for such a program by explain­
ing that there was a high probability of an imminent Japa­
nese surrender and showing the possibilities of a Japanese 
civil war or the emergence of a communist regime soon after 
if left unresolved.
The reeducation program, he continued, was allowed 
under the Geneva Convention, as long as it was voluntary, 
and would "provide a much needed intelligence service to 
the Navy, Army, and other agencies dealing with the 
problem of military administration in Japanese
9 7 . . . . .territories . . . . " He gave additional credibility to
such a program by showing its similarity to the successful 
Communist Chinese program.
A week later, two Japanese prisoners being interrogat­
ed at Byron Hot Springs admitted to being members of a 
group of prisoners "dedicated to the overthrow of Japanese 
militarism and to cooperate with American forces and au- 
thorities for the achievement of those ends." This 
would, they hoped, allow Japan to become a modern nation.
The movement had been organized at Sand Island, Hawaii 
and consisted of approximately thirty members, mostly
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graduates of universities or other higher education who had 
been part of Japan's liberal intelligensia. Many had been 
members of opposition groups before the war and some had 
even been imprisoned for their political views and actions.
The prisoners explained that the group had been scat­
tered by transfers, but requested that they be reassembled 
in a special camp, away from the other prisoners, where 
they could be indoctrinated with democratic principles and 
develop into strong, resourceful leaders.
The group's program, and that of the Japanese liberal- 
radical movement in general, had three objectives: the 
complete destruction of the militarists and their philoso­
phies; a complete political reformation, including the 
establishment of a representative government; and a reedu­
cation of Japan along modern, free-thinking, non-supersti- 
tious lines. The POW group conceived "itself as part of a 
powerful post-war group operating openly along usual propa­
gandists lines for the winning of the Japanese people over 
to their point of view and the consolidation of an irre­
versible popular opposition to the traditional militaris-
. . . . . . . . ? gtic-impenalistic-capitalistic Japan.
This group would serve as the nucleus for a larger 
group, which would be made up of prisoners who agreed with 
the group's philosophies. The larger group, estimated at 
about one hundred, would be trained for psychological 
warfare and would be used in many different areas. These
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areas included direct voice surrender talks, writing propa­
ganda leaflets, giving radio broadcasts, assisting in 
analysis of interrogation materials, infiltrating China and 
Japan for intelligence and information about American 
prisoners, appealing to well-educated "intellectuals" in 
Japan, and puncturing the Emperor-divinxty mythology.
During this same period, the Army and the State De­
partment had begun considering similar operations of their 
own, involving both prisoners of war and Japanese aliens in 
the United States. Very special care was being taken by 
each group to "devise and impose such controls as [were] 
necessary to ensure political objectives and methods which 
[were] American and not Communistic m  nature." In fact, 
Captain Okino, a Japanese Navy officer who had expressed 
his hopes for the eventual establishment of a democratic 
government in Japan, was suggested as the leader of the 
Navy group, to act as a stabilizing factor and to keep the 
group on the proper course. Also, since most, if not all, 
of the prisoners to be used were well known to the Japanese 
police, the Navy reviewed the need to offer them special 
protection, possibly even involving new identities and 
documents. By March 16, although senior Navy leaders 
suggested separating the project into military and politi­
cal programs and giving the political program to the State 
Department, the Office of War Information, or OSS, the 
program had been approved. Plans were made to cooperate
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with the Army and the State Department, although the Navy 
hoped to retain the initiative and control of the project.
By March 24, Admiral Thebaud, the Director of Naval 
Intelligence, separated the program into political and 
military objectives, since the "division of interest and 
objective [would] probably necessitate segregation of those 
Japanese to be used by the War and Navy Departments from 
the remainder", and requested immediate steps to start 
the program in a camp designed for one hundred prisoners 
and filled with an Indoctrination Staff. The military 
program would be run by the War and Navy Departments and 
the reeducation would be run by the State, War, and Navy 
Departments. Other agencies would "be permitted to partic­
ipate but not control or direct" the programs. ^  C.K. 
Parker, who had interrogated the first two prisoners, then 
provided a list of the prisoners willing to cooperate,
. . . 1 Rincluding a few biographical notes on each.
By the 1st of April, the Army responded. They agreed 
that the program would help U.S. psychological warfare, but 
refused to seriously consider "the infiltration of former 
Japanese prisoners of war before or during landing opera-
O /Ttions for espionage, sabotage, or propaganda purposes."
They also suggested that the political program would be 
ineffective since, in their opinion, the Chinese program 
had been ineffective as well. However, Colonel E.F.H. 
Svensson was designated as the Army representative for
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further investigation into the project. The Navy responded 
by designating Captain E.S. Pearce as the Naval representa­
tive . ^
The Navy again pressed for a separate camp, explaining 
that if the prisoners were transferred to permanent camps, 
they would "be subjected to the influence of Japanese 
Nationalists on one hand and antagonism from guards on the
O Oother." They also noted that the prxsoners were "not 
merely interested or friendly individuals who have been 
persuaded to help us. They are men who are dead in earnest 
about the project they hope to undertake and are already 
convinced of rts importance."
While the Army and Naval representatives discussed the 
program, the OSS met with the three "special project pris­
oners" to see if they would be useful to the OSS in propa­
ganda work. The meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, 
April 14, at the San Francisco Delousing Plant and was a 
resounding success. The prisoners were driven to the 
meeting in a closed van and interviewed by a first genera­
tion Japanese-American. They discussed their background 
and conditions in Japan as well as the possibility of 
cooperation. Then samples of propaganda material they had 
previously prepared were shown. Finally, the prisoners 
were given a ride through San Francisco to show "how normal 
life in the city was during war times.
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Three weeks later, May 4, 1945, the first "special 
project prisoner" was released from Byron Hot Springs to 
the Army. He was given to the OSS for propaganda use.
This irritated the Navy, who felt the Army was "somewhat 
freehanded" with Naval prisoners, and Byron Hot Springs was 
directed to keep the other two prisoners until a final plan 
for the program had been approved.^
On July 14, the Provost Marshal General presented the 
Army's proposed indoctrination program. John K. Emmerson 
of the Department of State, Charles W. Hepner of the Japa­
nese Section, Office of War Information, and the Special 
Projects Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office 
had conducted a secret study of the Japanese prisoners at 
Camps McCoy, Clarinda, and Angel Island. The Army had 
determined that such an indoctrination program would pro­
vide the American forces in Japan with reliable government 
officials to work with and test the educational and reha­
bilitation programs that were being considered for use 
during the postwar period. Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Hepner had 
"jointly recommended that [the] officers and non-commis­
sioned officers be segregated from the remainder of the 
prisoners before any organized course of indoctrination was 
u n d e r t a k e n . T h i s  had been done, as the Army had trans­
ferred all but the most cooperative officers and NCO's from 
Camp McCoy to Camp Kenedy, Texas.
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The Army's program proposed the establishment of an 
indoctrination camp, commanded by a lieutenant colonel with 
a knowledge of Japan and the Japanese language, which would 
follow the pattern of the German reorientation program.
The prisoners were to study current events, American histo­
ry and institutions, and the English language.4  ^ On July 
18, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army approved the 
program and the Army began searching for an appropriate 
camp for the program.44 Camp Hulen, Texas, an inactive 
camp in an isolated area was proposed for the site, but was 
quickly rejected in favor of Camp Huntsville, Texas. Two 
days after the program had been approved, the Army began 
transferring its German prisoners out of Huntsville and 
preparing it for use as a Japanese reeducation center.
Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore became the director of the 
reeducation program. He had been born in Japan and had 
lived there from 1924 to 1941. He was assisted by Dr. 
Hepner, one of the two men responsible for the program.4  ^
The Japanese prisoners were screened and evaluated and an 
initial group of the most cooperative were selected for 
special training. They studied "the English language and 
literature, comparisons of American and Japanese news­
papers, books, and magazines" and listened to a "dazzling 
program of lectures by the faculty of nearby Sam Houston 
State Teachers College, with simultaneous translation into 
Japanese."47 They also edited and published a newspaper,
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which was printed for distribution to the other Japanese
A Qprisoners, similar to the German Per Ruf. They were
encouraged to attend worship services held each Sunday "to
replace their traditional Emperor worship with a more
positive philosophy, and to show them the close relation-
• 4 9ships between democracy and Christxan principles."
The most important activity in the camp, however, was 
the individual and group study of certain topics "relating 
to the principles of American democracy and their applica­
tion in J a p a n . " T h e  topics ranged from an assessment of
Japan's civilian and military morale to the comparison of
51various segments of Japanese and American ways of life." 
These studies required both research and discussion and 
were meant to "require some measure of democratic input" 
from each prisoner and "serve as a barometer of the POW's 
morale and allegiance to the Emperor."
By December, when the prisoners began to be repatriat­
ed, a total of 205 prisoners had been selected and sent to 
either Camp Huntsville, Camp Kenedy, or Camp Hearne,
c o #Texas. Other prisoners, not selected for the special 
training, received books and brochures especially translat­
ed into Japanese for the their use, watched "suitable" 
motion pictures and filmstrips, and worked with an American
officer whose sole job was "to foster the orientation
54program within the camp.
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Although much work was put into these reeducation 
programs, no study was done to determine the impact of the 
programs on the Japanese prisoners or Japanese post-war 
politics.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The United States entered World War II totally unpre­
pared for the war or for the prisoners they would soon 
receive. However, they quickly developed a system to care 
for their prisoners that dealt with almost every conceiva­
ble contingency. The men in charge of the Japanese prison­
ers ensured the prisoners were well cared for, even though 
the American populace, as a whole, despised and distrusted 
the Japanese, as was seen by the internment of the Japa- 
nese-Americans, the ready acceptance of American atrocities 
in the Pacific, and the mob action at Marengo, Illinois.
Upon their arrival in the United States, the prisoners 
were treated rather brusquely because of the administrative 
and health requirements, but by the time they reached Byron 
Hot Springs, conditions had improved dramatically. The 
prisoners were required to obey strict rules and adhere to 
inflexible schedules, but they were able to regain some 
measure of the self-respect they felt they had lost when 
captured since they were treated as humans, rather than 
outcasts or non-entities. The interrogators were especial­
ly trained to deal with the prisoners and to appear 
omniscient and all-powerful. This allowed them to assume
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the role of benevolent protector to the prisoners.
When the prisoners were transferred to their permanent 
camps, conditions remained much the same. They were still 
treated with firm discipline and held to a rigid schedule, 
which now included work details, but were they well provid­
ed for and allowed to maintain some independence, though 
only in certain areas.
When the reeducation project started, the prisoners 
were divided into smaller groups of more cooperative and 
less cooperative prisoners. This allowed those who chose 
to be most cooperative even more latitude in their daily 
decisions, although they were still prisoners of war and 
treated as such.
There were several reasons for this humane treatment.
Most, if not all, of the men in charge of the Japanese
prisoners had a broad knowledge of Japan and its people.
The interrogators at Byron Hot Springs all spoke Japanese
fluently and had been chosen for their knowledge of the
area, even if they were not Nisei or Issei. Lt. Col.
Rogers, commander at Camp McCoy, was considered a "Jap
lover" by some of his men.^ Lt. Col. Weaver, commander at
Camp Livingston, told Sakamaki while he was there that:
My brother was a lieutenant of the United 
States Navy. He was with the cruiser Astoria.
You recall that when your ambassador, Mr.
Saito, died, the cruiser took the body of the 
ambassador to Japan. My brother received fine 
treatment from the Japanese people. He was 
always saying good things about the land of
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cherry blossoms. Then, when this war came, 
both he and the Astoria were sunk by the 
Japanese. I cannot like the Japan that caused 
the death of my brother, but I would not forget 
the things he said about your country and 
people. You can rest assured that I will do my 
duty as the commander of this camp to the best 
of my ability.
Lt. Col. Boude C. Moore, the man in charge of the 
reeducation program, had grown up in Japan. These men had 
a respect for and at least some understanding of the Japa­
nese people and their culture. However, this was not the 
only reason for their considerate treatment of the prison­
ers. No American wanted to give the Japanese any excuse to 
mistreat American prisoners in retaliation to a perceived 
mistreatment of Japanese prisoners in America. Neither did 
they want world opinion turned against them, as the Japa­
nese had attemted after a revolt on February 25, 1943, at 
Camp Featherston, New Zealand, and after a second on August 
5, 1944, at Cowra, Australia. Additionally, the Japanese 
prisoners had been trained to expect mistreatment at the 
hands of their captors. Thus, when mistreated or abused, 
they tended to become sullen and defiant, feeling that, in 
some way, they were helping to make up for being captured. 
However, when well-treated, they did not know how to re­
spond. Many reacted, as was seen in chapter five, by 
assisting the United States in various ways. In fact, when 
reports arrived at Byron Hot Springs that the prisoners at 
Clarinda were being routinely beaten by the guards, William
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P. Woodard, the officer in charge of Byron Hot Springs, 
quickly urged a stop to the practice. His explained his 
actions not in terms of human rights violations or because 
the actions were prohibited by the Geneva Convention, but 
by noting that if the prisoners were needed for further 
interrogation, he did not want them to be antagonistic to 
the U.S.^ Therefore, although few Japanese prisoners 
reached American soil, those who did
were well cared for because of American self-interest and 
the consideration and understanding of the men in charge of 
their internment.
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APPENDIX ONE
THE KOREANS
No history of the Japanese prisoners of war in World 
War II would be complete without mentioning the Korean 
prisoners. While the Korean prisoners had technically 
fought on the side of Japan, it is doubtful that anyone 
hated the Japanese more. Korea had once been an independ­
ent nation, but had been occupied by the Japanese since the 
turn of the century. For thirty years, the Japanese had 
treated the Koreans with contempt and disrespect.^ Then, 
with the beginning of war, the treatment became worse.
After January, 1944, the Japanese had conscripted any 
Korean between the ages of twenty and twenty-one who had 
five years of primary education and any Korean between 
twenty-one and twenty-five who was in good physical condi- 
tion, regardless of educational level. Although no com­
plete records were kept, the impact of this can be seen by
noting that "in one village of 93 houses, 30 men were
• .conscripted in the years of 1942-43" alone. The Koreans 
were conscripted for only two year terms, but "it was 
believed that many were kept for three years or longer."^ 
Once in the service, they were treated horribly by the 
Japanese. In fact, several prisoners stated that the
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Koreans were treated worse than Allied prisoners. They 
were "required to do the worst type of work and those used 
in the coal or iron mines were always found in the deepest 
and hottest places." When there was any possibility of 
their surrender, they were immediately killed. "One P/W 
captured on Saipan saw two women with babies strapped on 
their backs heading for American lines. A lieutenant, 
hiding in the same cave with them, killed them all for 
security reasons and would have killed [the] P/W had he 
known he was Korean."0 On another occasion, when a Korean 
attempted to escape from a coal mining camp near Yoshima,
he was "apprehended, taken to Yoshima and, after being
. . . 7tortured for fifteen days, was imprisoned."
These insults and atrocities developed a fierce hatred 
of the Japanese among the Koreans. When captured, they 
often volunteered to help their captors in any way possible 
and, on several occasions, volunteered to fight with the 
Americans against the Japanese.^
In fact, the Korean National Committee even proposed 
in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War that the 
Korean prisoners' "services should be utilized as an aid in 
the American war effort and as a Korean contribution to the
. . . . QUnited Nations at war with Japan and her Allies." More 
specifically, the Committee proposed "that these Koreans 
serve as labor units in American occupied territories, as 
aid to military intelligence, as infiltrative van to enemy
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territories, as liaison details in relation to other Ko­
reans as may still be found in increased service of the 
Japanese" in order to advance the cause of Korean independ­
ence . ^
The Judge Advocate General, after reading the propos­
al, determined that, although any use of the Korean prison­
ers of war for these purposes would violate Article 31 of 
the Geneva Convention, the United States could release them 
from their status as prisoners of war and then be able to 
legally accept their voluntary services without violating 
international law. However, this would not preclude the 
Japanese from declaring the Koreans guilty of treason and 
executing them if they were recaptured, as the U.S. could 
find no basis for recognizing Korea as an independent 
nation. ^  ^
When the U.S. chose to utilize Korean labor for the 
war effort without releasing them from their status as 
prisoners, Joseph R. Farrington, the U.S. Representative 
from Hawaii, asked that they be reclassified as a Korean 
service unit. This would "serve to reward them appropri­
ately for their good conduct and numerous and consistent 
manifestations of friendship to the United States and 
opposition to Japan; contribute in an important way to 
friendship between this country [U.S.] and Korea in the 
future; win the lasting gratitude of the permanent resi­
dents of this country of Korean extraction . . . , and
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reduce the military overhead required to maintain a prison­
er of war camp, and thereby release that many more soldiers
19 . . .  ,to their homes." There is no indication that the mili­
tary accepted this advice.
Even without this recognition, the Koreans continued 
to press their battle against Japan. In March, 1944, the 
Korean prisoners, led by Ch'anghwan Kim, formed the Kanshu, 
or Korean Eagle, Party. This party was dedicated to "repay 
at least in some slight measure the favors of our benefac­
tor, the United States," and to form a Korean independence 
movement. To accomplish these purposes, the members were 
to offer their lives to America and their homeland" to 
"fight for the righteous United Nations forces until the 
day of the final annihilation of Japan and Germany," who 
were responsible for both the war and the fact that they 
were held as prisoners.^
The chartering members of the group felt that all 
Korean prisoners were duty bound to join the organization 
and respect its precepts. Dues would be used to defray the 
expenses of the club and U.S. military forces. The U.S.,
while acknowledging the party, required membership to be
1 Rboth voluntary and free.
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APPENDIX TWO
MONTHLY CENSUS OF PRISONERS
End of month German Italian Japanese
December 1941 1
January 1942 1
February 1
March 1
April 1
May 31 1
June 32 1
July 39 10
August 55 10
September 130 47
October 130 53
November 380 51
December 512 1,317 52
January 1943 990 1,313 62
February 1,026 1,356 62
March 1,334 1,359 62
April 2,146 2,799 62
May 22,110 13,911 62
June 34,161 19,212 62
July 54,502 25,969 87
August 94,220 35,986 93
September 115,358 48,253 95
October 119,401 48,252 95
November 122,350 49,039 95
December 123,440 49,323 116
January 1944 124,822 49,826 116
February 127,252 49,993 142
March 133,135 50,136 347
April 133,967 50,168 367
May 135,796 50,164 408
June 146,101 50,278 569
July 173,980 50,276 607
August 192,868 50,272 730
September 248,205 51,034 1,143
October 248,781 51,032 1,242
November 306,856 51,156 2,443
December 306,581 51,071 2,629
Total
1
1
1
1
1
32
33 
49 
65
177
183
431
1,881
2,365
2,444
2,755
5,007
36,083
53,435
80,588
130,299
163,706
167,748
171,484
172,879
174,822
177,387
183,618
184,502
186,368
196,948
224,863
243,870
300,382
338,055
360,455
360,281
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End of Month German Italian Japanese Total
January 1945 306,306 50,561 2,820 359,687
February 307,404 50,571 3,021 360,996
March 312,144 50,550 3,260 365,954
April 345,920 50,304 3,294 399,518
May 271,683 50,273 3,915 425,871
June 371,505 50,052 4,249 425,806
July 367,513 49,789 4,828 422,130
August 361,322 49,184 5,413 415,919
September 355,458 42,915 4,938 403,311
October 351,150 35,065 4,930 391,145
November 324,623 29,539 4,257 358,419
December 313,234 25,696 2,086 341,016
January 1946 275,078 11,532 1 286,611
February 208,403 561 1 208,965
March 140,572 33 1 140,606
April 84,177 31 1 84,209
May 37,460 30 1 37,491
June 141 20 1 162
There were 32,000 PW's on military and civilian work
projects which terminated 15 June 1946. All PW 's were
repatriated by 30 June 1946 except 141 Germans, 20 Ital-
ians, and 1 Japanese serving sentences in U.S. penal insti
tutions. Information gathered from U.S. Provost Marshal 
General, "Reports on Prisoners of War, 1942-1946."
APPENDIX THREE
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
APPLICABLE TO PRISONERS
1. The prisoners will be organized into sections under 
their own officers and non-commissioned officers who will 
be responsible for their conduct. Prisoner of War officers 
and non-commissioned officers who fail to perform properly 
their duties of supervision of the men under them, or any 
other duty with which they may be entrusted, will be pun­
ished as offenders against good order and discipline.
2. No prisoner will be allowed to have in his possession 
any matches, knives, sharp instruments, razor blades, 
weapons of any description, photographic apparatus, field 
glasses, lamps, flashlights, inflammable articles, maps, 
tools, or money.
3. Smoking by prisoners is not permitted in any portion of 
the main building and mess hall. Smoking will be permitted 
in the recreational area and in latrines when recreational 
area cannot be used.
4. The prisoners will not be permitted to take knives and 
forks from the mess hall.
5. The necessary number of prisoners may be used at any 
time in the mess hall as kitchen police under the supervi­
sion of the mess sergeant.
6. Under the supervision of the Surgeon, each prisoner 
will be required to bathe at stated intervals and keep his 
person and clothing in a sanitary condition.
7. Arrangements for hair cutting will be made by providing 
barbers from among the prisoners.
8. A daily inspection of prisoners, dormitories, latrines 
and mess building will be made by the Commanding Officer or 
such other officer as he may designate.
9. A physical inspection of the prisoners and a sanitary 
inspection of the enclosure will be made at stated inter­
vals by the Surgeon.
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11. Each prisoner will make his own bed daily immediately 
upon arising and in the manner prescribed by the Commanding 
Officer.
12. Any prisoner conducting himself in a disorderly manner 
will be segregated from the other prisoners.
13. Any prisoner refusing to halt when ordered to do so by 
a sentry or guard will be fired on.
14. Prisoners will be required to salute all officers of 
the United States Army as prescribed for United States 
Troops.
15. Any prisoner who violates any lawful order or commits 
any military offense will be tried in the manner prescribed 
by law.
16. a. In case of fire all prisoners will assemble in the 
recreational area, and wait there until further orders.
b. In case of a "black out”, prisoners will remain in 
their dormitories.
17. All prisoners will adhere to the following daily 
schedule:
5:30am - Lights on in sleeping quarters and check of pris­
oners. Prisoners will immediately police their persons, 
bunks and proceed with general inside policing of barracks 
until breakfast.
6:30am - Breakfast. Just as soon as the mess sergeant 
notifies the sergeant of the guard that breakfast is ready, 
the sergeant of the guard will require the prisoners, 
excepting the sick prisoners, to fall out immediately and 
form at the north entrance to the mess hall.
7:00am - Outside fatigue when ordered. One outside detail 
will daily police Headquarters Office and vicinity. The 
inside detail will proceed immediately to the barracks and 
complete policing up the barracks. All prisoners, except­
ing those on the inside detail and those who are ill, will 
vacate the barracks on or before 7:00am, except on days of 
inclimate [sic] weather, and will remain in the recreation 
area until after the enclosure is inspected. The inside 
detail will vacated the barracks just as soon as their work 
is completed. During inclimate [sic] weather the prisoners 
will be permitted to remain in the barracks, but during 
inspection they will be required to stand by their bunks.
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8:30am - The sergeant of the guard will notify the Dispen­
sary at or before 8:30am the exact number of prisoners 
remaining in their bunks because of illness.
11:00am - Recall.
11:50am - Check of prisoners.
12:00 Noon - Dinner.
1:30pm - Recreation or fatigue when ordered.
3:30pm - Bathing, shaving, washing of clothing or fatigue 
when ordered.
5:30pm - Supper.
8:15pm - All in quarters.
8:20pm - Check prisoners.
9:00pm - Lights out.
18. These rules and regulations may be changed, varied, 
altered or modified and new or additional regulations 
prescribed from time to time, as circumstances may require.
Information from Rules and Regulations Applicable to 
Prisoners at Angel Island, California, dated 2 September 
1944, Record Group 389, Enemy POW Information Bureau, 
Reporting Branch, Subject File, 1942-1946, Inspection and 
Field Reports, Angel Island.
APPENDIX FOUR
ITEMS ISSUED TO PRISONERS
Quantity per
Item individual
Bags, Barrack 1
Bed, Sacks 2
Belts, Waist 1
Blankets or Comforters 2
Breeches, cotton, or trousers, working 2 pair*
Caps, or Hats, cotton 1
Coat, Cotton Khaki or Coat-working, denim 2*
Coats, wool 1
Cots, canvas 1
Drawers, cotton 4 pair
Gloves or Mittens 1 pair
*When deemed necessary by the camp commander.
Leggins (when Breeches are issued) 1 pair
Overcoats (or suitable substitute) 1
Raincoat (dismounted) 1
Pillows 1
Shirts 2
Shoes 1 pair
A second pair of shoes is authorized for issue when 
deemed necessary by the camp commander to safeguard the 
health of prisoners against inclement weather.
Socks 4 pair
Trousers or Breeches (wool) 2 pair
Undershirts, cotton 4
Straw or an adequate substitute for bedding may be 
issued at the rate of 15 pounds per man per month.
In addition, the following items are authorized for 
officer prisoners:
Cases, pillow 2
Chair, steel or folding 1
151
152
Cot, steel or bedstead, wooden 1
Covers, mattress 2**
Mattress 1
Sheets, bed 4
**In lieu of, not in addition to, bedsacks.
Items of clothing and equipage will be supplied from 
the following sources in the indicated order of priority:
(1) Obsolete Stock.
(2) CCC stock, except spruce green outer clothing.
(3) Class "X" Stock.
(4) Class B Stock.
(5) New stock, except that new stock of outer cloth­
ing and shoes, will be utilized only in cases of emergency.
Toilet articles, barber's and tailor's supplies will 
be issued in accordance with paragraph 10, AR 6003-75, 17 
May 1943, which states that the value of such supplies will 
not exceed one dollar per man per month. The following 
items are authorized:
Blades, safety, razor 
Brooms, whisk 
Brushes, shaving 
Brushes, shoe 
Brushes, tooth 
Buttons
Clippers, hair 
Combs, medium 
Handkerchiefs
Laces, shoe 
Needles
Polish, shoe, or dubbin
Powder or paste, tooth
Razor, safety
Soap, hand
Soap, shaving
Thread
Towels
A record of all clothing and equipment will be kept as 
provided for the enlisted men of the Army.
The following is a table of allowances of general 
supplies:
Item Quantity Remarks & Basis 
of Issue
Chinaware (thick ware):
Boat, sauce, 13 oz. 
Bowl, general issue
1 Per 10 men capacity
or plate, soup 
Bowl, sugar, with 
cover, 17 oz.
1 Per man
capacity 
Cup, coffee,
1 Per 5 men
unhandled 
Dish, vegetable,
1 Per man
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11-7/8 in. width 
(Bakers) (Plate, 
soup may be
substituted) 
Plate, dinner,
1 Per 2 men
9-5/8 in. dia. 1 Per man
Saucer, coffee 1 Per man
Glassware:
Bottle, vinegar with 
stoppers, 14-1/2
oz. cap. 1 Per 10 men
Pitcher, syrup,
20 oz. capacity 1 Per 2 men
Shaker, salt 1 Per 10 men
Shaker, pepper 1 Per 10 men
Tumbler, 10 oz. cap. 1 Per man
Kitchen Utensils:
Bowl, mixing, large 1 Per 150 men
Brush, meat block, wire 1 Per 150 men
Cleaver, butchers
8 in. blade 1 Per 75 men
Clock
Colander, 5-1/4 in.
1 Per mess
x 6 1/2 in. 1 Per mess
Dipper, tin or
enamelware 1-2 qt. 
Fork, cook, flesh,
1 Per 30 men
2 tine, 15 in. 
Fork, cook, flesh,
1 Per 30 men
2 tine, 21 in. 1 Per mess
Grater, vegetable 
Griddle, cast iron,
2 Per mess
20x20 1 Per 75 men or major
fraction thereof
but not to exceed
5 per mess.
Knife, boning 1 Per 75 men
Knife, bread, 10 in. 
blade
Knife, butcher
1 Per 75 men
10 in. blade 1 Per 75 men
Knife, cooks 1 Per 75 men or major
fraction
thereof 
Knife, paring 1 Per 25 men or major
fraction
thereof
Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia 1 Per 40 men or major
bowl 15 in. fraction thereof
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Ladle, 4-1/2 in. dia. 1 
bowl 21 in.
ofMachine, hand operated
chopper or grinder 
(meat and food), 
large 1
Masher, potato pounder 1
Measurer, 1/2 qt.
tin or enamel 1
Measure, 1 qt.
tin or enamel 1
Opener, can,
hand operated 1
Pan, bake & roast 
4-3/4xl2-l/2x 
20-1/4 in. 1
Pan, bake & roast 
4-3/4x20-1/4x 
26-1/4 in.
(100 ration) 1
Pan, baking sheet,
1x18x25 in. 1
Pan, cake or pie,
9 in. 1
Pan, dish 1
Pan, frying, 12 in. 1
Peeler, potato 1
Pin, rolling 1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 10 gal. 1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 15 gal. 1
Pots, stock, with
cover, 20 gal. 1
Saw, butcher, 22 in. 1 
Scale, weighing, 
counter scoop,
10 lbs. 1
Scraper, dough,
6 in. 1
Sieve, flour,
wood, 18 in. 1
Skimmer 1
Spatula, wood,
37 in. 1
Spoon, basting,
15 in. 1
Spoon, basting,
21 in. 1
Spoon, serving,
slotted 1
Per 40 men or major 
fraction there-
Per 75 men 
Per 150 men
Per 150 men
Per 150 men
Per 25 men
Per 25 men
Per 50 men
Per 30 men
Per 6 men 
Per 30 men 
Per 75 men 
Per 25 men 
Per 150 men
Per 50 men
Per 50 men
Per 75 men 
Per 75 men
Per mess
Per 75 men
Per 150 men 
Per 75 men
Per 75 men
Per 25 men
Per mess
Per 40 men
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Steel, butchers',
10 in. 1 Per 150 men
Stone, sharpening 
Turner, cake,
1 Per mess
15 in. 1 Per 4 0 men
Whip, egg, 12 in. 1 Per 7 5 men
Whip, egg, 16 in. 1 Per 75 men
Miscellaneous:
Axe, handled,
chopping, 
single,
standard grade
3-1/2-4 lb. 3 Per company
Bit Board, wash 1 Per 25 men
Brooms, corn 1 Per 14 men per month
Brush, floor, 1 Per 14 men per month
scrubbing, hand 
Bucket, general purpose 
galvanized 14 qt.
Can, ash or garbage,
1 Per 20 men
galvanized w/ cover 
(approx. 32 gal.) 1 Per 25 men
Candles, pound 1 Per 60 men per day
when no other 
light is 
furnished.
Handles, mop, 
Handle, mop,
spring
of
1 Per 50 men or frac­
tion level there-
per annum
Irons, hand 5 Per company
Mop, cotton 1
Tableware:
Per 25 men per month
Fork, table 1 Per man
Knife, table grill 
Pitcher, water
1 Per man
5-1/2 qt. 1 Per 10 men
Platter, meat 1 Per 10 men
Spoon, table (med.) 
Spoon, table
1 Per man
(serving) 1 Per 2 men
Spoon, tea 1 Per man
Information found in Prisoner of War Circular #1, 
Record Group 389, Prisoner of War Operations Division, 
Operations Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1942-1945,
383.6, Misc. to Camp Policy.
A P P E N D I X  FIVE
Menu
Breakfast 
Wheat Cereal 
Potatoes 
Salt Pork
w/ Milk Gravy 
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Milk
Tea
Menu
Breakfast 
Stewed Prunes 
Oatmeal 
Toast
Butter or Oleo 
Milk
Menu
Breakfast
Grapefruit
Cornmeal Mush
Milk
Rice
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
SUGGESTED MENUS
for the 1st, 11th, and 
Dinner
Oriental Stew 
Boiled Rice 
Cauliflower 
Bread
Fresh Fruit
for the 2nd, 12th, and 
Dinner
Japanese Mixed 
Rice w/Beef 
Cabbage 
Bean Sprouts 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Spice Cookies
for the 3rd, 13th, and
Dinner
Sushi
Bread
Fried Potatoes 
Escalloped Tomatoes 
Bread Pudding
21st Days 
Supper
Japanese Soup 
Red Bean Salad 
Rice 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Apple Pie 
Tea
22nd Days
Supper 
Bean Soup
Pickled Beet Salad
Rice Pudding
Tea
23rd Days 
Supper
Vegetable tempura 
Noodles 
Fried Onions 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Sliced Cheese 
Crackers 
Tea
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Menu for the 4th, 14th, and 24th Days
Breakfast 
Stewed Raisins 
Wheat Cereal 
Milk
Fried Eggs 
Fried Potatoes 
Bread 
Tea
Apple Butter
Dinner
Sukiyaki
Rice
Carrots
Onions
Bread
Cornstarch Pudding 
Butter or Oleo
Supper
Spaghetti w/Cheese 
& Tomato Sauce 
Green Salad 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
Menu for the 5th, 15th, and 25th Days
Breakfast 
Grapefruit 
Fried Rice 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
Dinner
Chashu & Noodles
Spinach
Rice
Bread
Sweet Potato 
Pudding
Supper
Japanese Soup 
Boiled Beans 
Fresh Pickled Cab­
bage 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Sliced Cheese 
Tea
Menu for the 6th, 16th, and 26th Days
Breakfast Dinner Supper
Baked Apples Beef Heart Egg Soup
Wheat Cereal Boiled Potatoes Rice
French Toast Celery Peas
Sirup [sic] Bread Bread
Butter or Oleo Fresh Pickled Butter or Oleo
Tea Turnips 
Rice Pudding
Jelly
Fruit Cocktail
Menu for the 7th, 17th, and 27th Days
Breakfast
Oranges
Oatmeal
Milk
Fried Potatoes 
Bread
Apple Butter 
Tea
Dinner 
Veal Stew 
String Beans 
Rice 
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Supper 
Baked Beans 
Vegetable Salad 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Oatmeal Cookies 
Tea
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Menu for the 8th, 18th, and 28th Days
Breakfast 
Tomato Juice 
Oatmeal 
Boiled Rice 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
Toastie
Dinner
Scrambled Eggs & 
Sliced Cheese 
Rice
Boiled Lima Beans
Eggplant
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Bread Pudding
Supper
Fish Teriyaki 
Boiled Noodles 
Pickled Rutabagas 
Bread
Apple Butter 
Tea
Menu for the 9th, 19th, and 29th Days
Breakfast 
Apples 
Boiled Rice 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
Dinner
Egg Foo Young 
Shoyu Sauce 
Rice 
Spinach 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Cottage Pudding
Supper 
Tomato Soup 
Macaroni & Cheese 
Sliced Onions 
w/ Greens 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Tea
Menu for the 10th, 20th, and 30th Days
Breakfast 
Oranges 
Oatmeal 
French Toast 
Sirup [sic] 
Tea
Dinner
Sukiyaki
Rice
Japanese Pickles 
Escalloped Tomatoes 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Bread
Butter or Oleo
Supper
Potato & Celery Soup 
Cabbage Roll w/ 
Tomato Sauce 
Sweet Potatoes 
Bread
Butter or Oleo 
Prune Pudding 
Tea
Japanese Menu, Prepared in Office of the Quartermaster 
General, Washington, D.C., RG 160 Army Service Forces, 
Office of the Commanding General, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Service Commands, Correspondence Files, 1943-45, 333.6 
Prisoners of War, Form Class.
A P P E N D I X  SIX
MONTHLY PAY CHART FOR OFFICER PRISONERS
JAPANESE AMERICAN EQUIVALENT
ARMY NAVY PAY ARMY NAVY
Taisho Taisho 128.91 General Admiral
Chu jo Chu jo 113.29 Lt General Vice Admiral
Shosho Shosho 97.66 Maj General Rear Admiral
Taisa Taisa 81.06 Colonel Captain
Chusa Chusa 62.90 Lt Colonel Commander
Shosa Shosa 45.51 Major Lt Commander
Taii Itto Tokumu Taii 40.43
Taii Nito Taii Itto 37.11
Taii Santo Taii Nito 32.23 Captain Lieutenant
Taii Santo 28.71
Chui Itto Chui
Chui Nito Tokumu Chui 28.00 1st Lieutenant Lt(j.g.)
Shoi Shoi Tokumu Shoi 25.00 2nd Lieutenant Ensign
Information from TM 19-500, 25 April 1945, Change 4,
Section 3, Paragraph 9, p. 4.5.
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